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I. A BRIEF STORY OF THE YUKOS GROUP
The first decade of the twenty-first century is famous for its corpo-
rate governance and accounting scandals, which finally led to the
adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US and analogous legislation
around the world. The events of September 11 th, 2001 led to the adop-
tion of a complex, multi-level, international anti-money laundering
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legislative framework, which has had a great impact on anti-money
laundering regimes worldwide. This adoption, however, appears to also
be capable of generating uninvited money laundering scandals. Before
the universal adoption of internationally recognized principles against
money laundering, such scandals could be understood as the logical im-
plication of a country's non-compliance. However, it is now evident that
for the roots of known international corporate failures are much deeper
and need to be thoroughly researched.
The notorious Yukos Oil Company case, which has been on-going
since early 2003, can be taken as a striking example of a new type of
corporate disaster. The case represents a potential danger that has not yet
been properly estimated. Yukos Oil Company was one of the biggest
Russian "virtually integrated holding oil companies"' that was created in
the course of large scale Russian privatization and sold to the Menatep
Group in one of the infamous post-Soviet "loans-for-shares" tenders .
According to the U.N. Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention,
The loans-for-shares programme of 1995 has been widely criti-
cized for its lack of transparency and for its fraudulent
arrangements. Under this programme, the gems of the Russian
economy-most promising companies in the industrial and en-
ergy sector-were in fact sold out to businesses in exchange for
minimal loans to the Government.'
Yukos, under Menatep's control, widely used asset-stripping tech-
niques, as did the majority of Russian production companies sold to
oligarchy groups. This allowed the controlling shareholders to enjoy the
benefits of non-transparency and transfer pricing, which resulted in ex-
cessive profit.4 However, in 2000, under the leadership of Mikhail
1. Yuko Iji, Corporate Control and Governance Practices in Russia 28 (Sch. Of Sla-
vonic and E. European Studies, Univ. Coll. London, Working Paper No. 33, 2003).
2. For a discussion of the problem of the "loans-for-shares" tenders, see Bernard
Black, Reinier Kraakman & Anna Tarassova, Russian Privatization and Corporate Govern-
ance: What Went Wrong, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731, 1742-50 (2000); see also Ira W. Lieberman
& Rogi Veimetra, The Rush for State Shares in the "Klondyke" of Wild East Capitalism:
Loans-for-Shares Transactions in Russia, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 737 (1996).
3. GLOBAL PROGRAM AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING, U.N. OFFICE FOR DRUG CON-
TROL AND CRIME PREVENTION, RUSSIAN CAPITALISM AND MONEY-LAUNDERING at 7, U.N.
Sales No. E. 01.XI.6 (2001).
4. See Bernard Black, The Corporate Governance Behavior and Market Value of Rus-
sian Firms, 2 EMERGING MARKETS REVIEW 89 ( 2001); Black et. al., supra note 2, at 1769-
72; Merritt B. Fox & Michael A. Heller, Corporate Governance Lessons from Russian Enter-
prise Fiascoes, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1720, 1743-45 (2000); Andreas Heinrich, Aleksandra Lis &
Heiko Pleines, Corporate Governance in the Oil and Gas Industry. Cases from Poland, Hun-
gary, Russia & Ukraine in a Comparative Perspective 18-20 (Koszalin Inst. Of Comparative
European Studies [KICES], Working Paper No. 3, 2005; Iji, supra note 1, at 14-20; Carsten
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Khodorkovsky, the core Menatep Group shareholder and CEO of Yukos,
the Company changed its strategy and began implementing international
standards of financial reporting and accountability. Within several years,
Yukos evolved from an oligarchic structure into a favorite of the Russian
securities market and companies such as Standard and Poor's, which rate
corporate governance.5 The Company approved its own ADR program
and published annual and quarterly accounts, which were audited by
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC).
6
FIGURE I
THE GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE YUKOS GROUP7
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The Yukos case is a complex and ambiguous composition of fraud,
tax evasion, and other criminal cases that were launched against several
Yukos shareholders, managers and employees.8 The backbone of the case
Sprenger, Ownership and Corporate Governance in Russian Industry: A Survey 11 (European
Bank for Reconstruction & Dev., Working Paper No. 70, Jan. 2002).
5. See, e.g., Iji, supra note 1, at 30-34.
6. Heinrich et. al., supra note 4, at 20. See also Diana Yousef-Martinek et. al., Yukos
Oil: A Corporate Governance Success Story, THE CHAZEN WEB J. OF INT'L Bus., Fall 2003,
at 1-11.
7. Iji, supra note 1, at 21. See also YUKOS: About Us, http://www.yukos.com/
About -us (last visited Sept. 15, 2007); MALCOLM S. SALTER, OAO YUKOS OIL COMPANY 9
(2001), available at http://harvardbusinessonline.hbsp.harvard.edu.
8. S. FORTESCUE, RUSSIA'S OIL AND BARONS AND METAL MAGNATES 121-31 (2006);
Leon Aron, The Yukos Affair, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y REs., Fall 2003, at 10,
available at http://www.aei.org; Peter Clateman, Further Legal Observations on the Yukos Affair,
JOHNSON'S RUSSIA LIST, Sept. 3, 2004, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/Yukos-tax.pdf;
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is the money laundering charges brought against the organized criminal
group, which allegedly comprised of the Company's top managers and
was headed by Khodorkovsky. Khodorkovsky and his allies have been
charged with laundering approximately 27 billion U.S. dollars-the ap-
proximate equivalent of the Company's profits over a four-year period.9
The complexity of the Yukos case could be seen from the following
figures: the total number of exclusively personal criminal cases launched
against managers, employees, or affiliated persons of the Company has
exceeded one hundred; '° the overall number of the individuals, charged,
or prosecuted totalled more than sixty;" the number of court cases in
different jurisdictions,' 2 including Russia, has already exceeded five
hundred;'3 the number of individuals on the Interpol search list is fif-
teen."' The case is also famous for the biggest tax claim sum in recent
Russian history and the largest amount of laundered funds.'5
Peter Clateman, Summary and Analysis of the Statement on the Form of the Indictment Pre-
sented to Platon Lebedev, JOHNSON'S RUSSIA LIST, Dec. 10, 2003, http://www.cdi.org/russia/
johnson/7462-9.cfm [hereinafter Summary and Analysis].
9. See Catherine Belton, Khodorkovsky Faces Fresh Charges Yukos, FINANCIAL TIMES
(UK), Feb. 6, 2007 at 6; Yukos Bosses to Face New Charges, THE INDEP. (UK), Jan. 17, 2007,
at 19; ROBERT AMSTERDAM AND DEAN PEROFF, WHITE PAPER ON ABUSE OF STATE AUTHOR-
ITY IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION-THE NEW POLITICALLY DRIVEN CHARGES AGAINST
MICHAIL KHODORKOVSKY 9-11 (2007), http://www.robertamsterdam.com/Abuse%20of%20
State%20Authority%20in%20the%20Russian%20Federation.pdf; Join Madslien, Russia's
Money Laundering Charges, BBC NEWS, July 16, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/
business/1431684.stm; Roman Ukolov, Delo YUKOSA: Sud Tretii [The Case of Yukos: Trial
Three], DEMOS (Moscow), July 8, 2005, http://www.demos-center.ru/publications/3954.html.
10. This is an approximate figure obtained through the author's own calculations. See
Alexey Krutilin, Criminal Alphabet of Yukos, Feb. 26, 2007, http://prigovor.com/info/
37657.html; Mikhail Khodorkovsky Press-Center, Timeline, http://www.khodorkovsky.info/
timeline/, [hereinafter Press-Center Timeline]. See also Ugolovno-pravovoi Analiz Deistvii,
Sovershennykh Rukovoditeliami i Sobstvennikami Gruppy "Menatel-Posprom-IUKOS" v Prot-
sesse Predprinimatel'skoydeiatel'nosti [The Criminal Analysis of the Action Committed by the
Shareholders and Managers of the Menatep-Rosprom- Yukos Group in the Course of Its Busi-
ness Activity] [hereinafter Criminal Analysis], KOMPROMAT, Dec. 24, 2003, http://
compromat.ru/main/hodorkovskiy/ugo.htm (advocating for the beginning of a wide-scale
criminal investigation under misdemeanor charges).
11. Krutilin, supra note 10.
12. For example, a PACER search of cases filed under "In Re Yukos Oil Co." before
Judge Letitia Z. Clark (Bankr. S.D. Tex. R. 1001(c)) turns up 244 results between Dec. 14,
2004 and Mar. 5, 2006 (on file with author). See also U.S. District Court, https://ecf.txsd.
uscourts.gov.
13. This figure was obtained through the author's personal calculations and accounts
for court hearings on the tax debts of Yukos subsidiaries, extradition and criminal cases, and
cases before the European Court of Human Rights.
14. As of May 1, 2007.
15. See General'naia Prokuratura Rossiiskoi Federatsii Zavershila Rassledovanie
Utolovnogo Dela v Otnoshenii Mikhaila Khodorkovskogo i Platona Lebedeva [The General
Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation Has Completed its Investigation of Mikhail
Khodorokovsky and Platon Lebedev's Criminal Case], Feb. 16, 2007, http://www.genproc.
gov.ru/ru/news/print.shtml?id=5467 [hereinafter The Summary of the Charges].
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The factors and circumstances leading to the collapse of Yukos are
manifold, and can be analyzed from different angles. Some commenta-
tors think that the Yukos case is a reflection of the general problems of
partisan and predatory privatization in Russia:
Privatization did create the property owners in the Russian Fed-
eration-masses of small shareholders without any power to
influence decisions over the enterprises they "own." It also pro-
duced few "new Russians," who have acquired enormous wealth
by skillfully taking advantage of the weaknesses of the transition
period, including the lack of transparent and clear rules and di-
minished law enforcement capacities of the State. In the absence
of appropriate rules to regulate or mechanisms to monitor the
developments, the market-oriented transformations, particularly
privatization, stimulated an unprecedented rise in the legaliza-
tion of criminal assets and property acquired by unlawful
16
means.
Yukos defenders, among them prominent politicians, lawyers and ana-
lysts, clearly see a political motivated element to the case. The defenders
argue that Yukos individuals have been prosecuted and the Company is
facing liquidation exclusively because of Khodorkovsky's political and
public activities." Others consider Khodorkovsky to be a mere criminal
who headed Russia's most powerful and dangerous "corporate criminal
group."'18 The moderate analysts see in the Yukos collapse a culmination
of Putin's fight against oligarchs, his quest to strengthen a weak Russian
state, and the clash between different influential Kremlin groups
16. U.N. OFFICE FOR DRUG CONTROL & CRIME PREVENTION, RUSSIAN CAPITALISM
AND MONEY-LAUNDERING, at 6, Sales No. E.0l.XI.6 (2001) [hereinafter Russian Capitalism
and Money-Laundering].
17. See, e.g., EUR. PARL. Ass., The Circumstances Surrounding the Arrest and Prosecu-
tion of Leading Yukos Executives, Doc. 10368 (2004) [hereinafter Doc. 10368]; MIKHAIL
DELYAGIN, INSTITUTE FOR GLOBALIZATION ISSUES, THE YUKOS CASE AS A MIRROR ON THE
"DICTATORSHIP OF SQUALOR" (2005), http://www.khodorkovsky.info/docs/Delyagin_4 19
05.pdf; Yury Schmidt, The Khodorkovsky Case: A Defense Attorney's Standpoint, THE P0-
LITICAL PERSECUTION OF MIKHAIL KHODORKOVSKY (Wash., D.C.), Apr. 12, 2004, http://
www.supportmbk.com/documents/schmidt-standpoint.cfm; PLATON LEBEDEV PRESS CTR, US
STATE DEPARTMENT DETAILS HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS OF YUKOS CASE, Mar. 7, 2007,
http://www.lebedevtrial.com/support/human-rights/state-7March2007.cfm.
18. Krutilin, supra note 10; Vladimir Perekrest, What is Mikhail Khodorkovsky Behind
Bars for (Part 1), May 18, 2006, http://prigovor.cominfo/37302.html [hereinafter Part 1];
David Schor, The Yukos Affair: Rectifying the Past or Polluting the Future?, THE BIRCH: A
JOURNAL OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN CULTURE, http://www.thebirchonline.org/
schor.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2008); Vadim Volkov, <Delo Standard Oib I eDelo YUKOSa
[hereinafter Standard Oil and Yukos Cases].
Summer 2007]
Michigan Journal of International Law
struggling for oil revenues. These moderates nevertheless recognize the
element of selective treatment in the Yukos case. 9
Yukos's accounts were audited by one of the biggest auditing firms.
The company had shares listed on international stock exchanges, and it
was considered a paragon of Russian corporate governance and transpar-
ency. The core question in the story then is how such a company has
become involved in a money laundering scandal of unprecedented mag-
nitude.
II. THE YUKOS CASE: THE TIMELINE AND THE CONSEQUENCES
The Yukos case effectively began in 2003, when a Council for Na-
tional Strategy report titled "The State Versus the Oligarchy" highlighted
the political thrust of the case.2 0 The report was aimed at oligarchs who
were accused of privatization by theft, impoverishment of the nation, the
"creation of a system of anti-national values," and high treason by ap-
pealing to outside countries for help and "representing outside interests."
They were also accused of forcing through "oligarchic modernization,"
and ultimately of trying to acquire a dominant position in the state.2'
The real confrontation between Yukos and the State, represented by
the General Prosecutors Office, started on July 2nd, 2003 when
Khodorkovsky's personal friend and the CEO of the Menatep Group,
22Platon Lebedev, was arrested . Lebedev's arrest was widely interpreted
as a "warning" to Khodorkovsky to leave Russia. However, Khodork-
ovsky did not leave. Instead, he made desperate attempts to mitigate the
attack on Yukos on his allies. He traveled to the United States, aiming to
persuade high ranking US politicians to intervene, and he made a hectic
tour around the main Russian regions meeting the governors.23 Putin's
19. E. Shamseeva, Yukos's Affairs and the Yukos Case, THE PUBLIC OPINION FOUNDA-
TION DATABASE, July 15, 2003, http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/map/shamseeva/ed032836;
WPS RUSSIAN MEDIA MONITORING AGENCY, ANATOLII CHUBAIS o DELE "YUKOSA" I SE-
GODNIASHEM ZASEDANI RSPP (2003) (on file with author). See also Peter L. Clateman, Yukos
Affair, Part VII: Review of the Criminal Sentence and Appeal, JOHNSON'S RUSSIA LIST, Mar.
29, 2006, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2006-78-19.cfm ("The premise of this series of
comments is that regardless of what 'political' motives may lay behind the Yukos Affair, the
legal cases that comprise this affair show the Russian courts both struggling with important
legal concepts and reaching new levels of understanding regarding modern fraud and tax eva-
sion.").
20. See Delyagin, supra note 17, at 16.
21. Wojciech Kononczuk, The "Yukos Affair:" Its Motives and Implications, (Prace
OSW/Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, Poland) 2006, at 39.
22. Fortescue, supra note 8, at 121-23; Press-Center Timeline, supra note 10.
23. Fortescue, supra note 8, at 123-26.
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allies viewed such an undertaking as a political gesture," and Khodork-
ovsky was arrested in Novisibisk and charged with various counts of
fraud and tax evasion." His hearing lasted for approximately a year.
Regardless of the efforts of numerous lawyers,26 he and Lebedev were
finally sentenced to 8 years detention in Chita, Siberia.27 Lawyers have
since filed several claims with the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR). These filings have yet to be decided.
In July 2003, the Ministry of Tax and Levies initiated an extraordi-
nary audit of Yukos's books. As a result of the audit, Yukos was hit
with a claim for $3.5 billion.29 The same action was repeated over three
times in three subsequent years, totaling a claim of approximately 27
billion U.S. dollars.3 ° The Government decided to organize a forced
sale of Yukos's main production unit, Yganskneftegas, in December
24. See Alexey K. Pushkov, Putin and His Enemies, NAT'L INT., Winter 2004/2005,
at 52; Kremlin vs. Yukos: Oil Company Caught in Kremlin Sights, RUSSIAN LIFE, Sept./Oct.
2003, at 6.
25. For general information on the Putin-Khodorkovsky clash, see Catherine Belton,
The Arrest That Proved a Turning Point, Moscow TIMES, Oct. 25, 2006, at 1; The Tycoon
and the President, ECONOMIST, May 21, 2005, at 24, available at http://www.
economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story-id=3983898.
26. See ROBERT AMSTERDAM & CHARLES KRAUSE, CONSTITUTIONAL AND DUE
PROCESS VIOLATIONS IN THE KHODORKOVSKY/YUKOS CASE: A WHITE PAPER PREPARED BY
DEFENSE LAWYERS ON BEHALF MIKHAIL KHODORKOVSKY, PLATON LEBEDEV & ALEXEI
PICHUGIN, http://www.robertamsterdam.com/Abuse%20of%20State%20Authority%20in%
20the%2ORussian%20Federation.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2008).
27. Russian Oil Tycoon Gets Nine Years' Jail, BIRMINGHAM POST (Eng.), June 1,
2005, at 8; Russian oil tycoon loses appeal against 8-year sentence, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
May 3, 2006, http://www.iht.comarticles/2006/05/03/europe/web.O503khod.php; Yukos
Ex-Chief Jailed for 9 Years, BBC NEWS, 31 May 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/
business/4595289.stm.
28. See, e.g., Lebedev v. Russia, App. No. 4493/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (May 18, 2006),
(admitting applicant's due process complaints for further examination); see also Additional
Memorandum, Yukos Oil Co. v. Russia, App. No. 14902/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Oct. 30, 2006)
(respondent's reply brief); Platon Lebedev Press Center, European Court of Human Rights
to Hear Part of a Complaint Against Russia Filed by Platon Lebedev, http://www.
lebedevtrial.com/media/2006/June_2006.cfm (last visited Sept. 16, 2007).
29. Resolution of the Ministry for Taxes and Duties of the Russian Federation # 14-
3-05/1609-1, To Hold the Taxpayer Fiscally Liable for a Tax Offense at 120 (Apr. 14,
2004), available at http://www.yukos.com/taxes/YUKOStaxResolution full.pdf.
30. Democracy on the Retreat in Russia: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 109th Cong. 3 (2005) (testimony of Tim Osborne, Member, Board of directors of Group
Menatep), http://www.senate.gov/-foreign/testimony/2005/OsbomeTestimony050217.pdf [here-
inafter Osborne, Democracy on the Retreat]; Democracy on the Retreat in Russia: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 109th Cong. 4 (2005) (written testimony of Steven
Theede, Chief Executive Officer, Yukos Oil Company), http://www.senate.gov/-foreign/
testimony/2005/TheedeTestimony050217.pdf [hereinafter Theede, Democracy on the Retreat].
See also INCREMENTAL TAX ASSESSED ON YUKOS vs. YUKOS FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
(Dec. 10, 2004), http://www.yukos.com/mp-upload/image/decI0.pdf [hereinafter INCRE-
MENTAL TAX ASSESSED].
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2004.' The management, which flew out of the country under pressure
from the prosecutor, undertook an unprecedented attempt to block the
sale by filing a Chapter 11 claim with the US bankruptcy court in
Houston. The court initially issued a temporary restraining order, pro-
hibiting Russian companies and western banks from participating in
the questionable auction for several years, but finally the claim was
declined.32 In spring 2006, Yukos's western creditors commenced the
liquidation procedure.33 By June 2007, the majority of Yukos's assets
had been auctioned off and acquired, mainly by the state-owned com-
panies of Gazprom and Rosneft.34
Supporters of Putin at the Kremlin were aware that Khordork-
ovsky's first term in prison would be coming to its mid-point in
October 2007, at which point Khodordovsky would be able to request
release on payroll. The supporters therefore arranged for a second
group of charges to be brought against Khodorkovsky and his allies in
February 2007.
31. Osborne, Democracy on the Retreat, supra note 30, at 5-6.
32. See Bill Condie, Yukos Bankruptcy Move Thrown out by US Judge, THE EVENING
STANDARD (London), Feb. 25 2005, at 46; see also Kurt A. Mayr, A Tale of Two Proceed-
ings: "Turnabout Is Fair Play" In the Yukos U.S. Bankruptcy Cases, AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
July-Aug. 2006, at 24-25, 67-69.
33. See Theede, Democracy on the Retreat, supra note 30; Catherine Belton, Banks
Want Yukos Ruled Bankrupt, Moscow TIMES, Mar. 13, 2006, at 1.
34. See Catherine Belton, BP Pulls Out of Yukos Auction, FINANCIAL TIMES, Mar. 27,
2007,at WORLD NEWS-EUROPE 2, available at http://www.ft.comlcms/s/84bf76b4-
dc40-1 ldb-a21d-000b5df10621.html; Rosneft Wins First Yukos Auction, BBC NEWS, Mar.
27, 2007, at B3, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6498163.stm.
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FIGURE II
DIAGRAM OF THE YUKOS CASE35
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The impact of the Yukos case on western and international case law
is quite significant. For example, the Yukos case has led to disputes over
the definition of what constitutes a politically motivated crime in con-
temporary Europe, and disquiet over the use of financial crime charges
to camouflage politically motivated prosecution.36 Another impact is the
35. The diagram was prepared based on the following sources: Prigovor Imenem Ros-
siiskoi Federatsii (Meshchanskii Raionny Sud, G. Moskvy, 16 Maia 2005 G.) [Judgment in the
Name of the Russian Federation (Meshansky Dist. Ct., City of Moscow, May 16, 2005)], 2-4,
6-8 available at http://www.khodorkovsky.ru/docs/prigovor_16.05.2005.pdf [hereinafter
Judgment]; see also Osborne, Democracy on the Retreat, supra note 30; Michael Johns, Letter
to the Editor, Khodorkovsky Crimes, RUSSIAN LIFE, Jan.-Feb. 2006, at 5; Amsterdam and
Krause, supra note 26; Amsterdam & Peroff, supra note 9; Clateman, Further Legal Observa-
tions, supra note 8; Clateman, Summary and Analysis, supra note 8; Peter Clateman, Legal
Observations on the Yukos Affair: Part V, JOHNSON'S RUSSIA LIST, Jan. 17, 2005,
http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9020-20.cfm; Criminal Analysis, supra note 10; Krutilin,
supra note 10.
36. See, e.g., EUR. PARL. ASS., The Circumstances Surrounding the Arrest and Prosecu-
tion of Leading Yukos Executives, Res. 1418 (2005); Anna Arutunyan & Oleg Liakhovich,
Amnesty International: Khodorkovsky Not a Political Prisoner, Moscow NEWS, Apr. 20,
2005, available at http://english.mn.ru/english/issue.php?2005-15-12; Amnesty Int'l, Russian
Federation: The Case of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Other Individuals Associated with
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contribution, provided by the Yukos Chapter 11 case decision, to Ameri-
can bankruptcy case law." This case has actually already been
recognised as a benchmark case concerning the "forum shopping prob-
lem."38 Even more interesting might be the decision of the ECHR on the
Yukos "tax story," which may set a new benchmark for ECHR tax
39
cases.
III. THE MONEY LAUNDERING LEGISLATION OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
It is widely recognized that the transition period from socialism to
capitalism in the Russian Federation appeared to present limitless oppor-
tunities for international money laundering.0 Money laundering in the
Russian Federation is closely intertwined with the wide-ranging politi-
cal, economic and social processes in the country. It has actually become
one of the core characteristics of contemporary capitalism in the Russian
Federation. It is accepted that, in Russia, it remains incredibly difficult
to prosecute alleged criminals due to the lack of appropriate legal
frameworks to fight sophisticated financial crimes. 42 However, the Yukos
case demonstrates an opposing tendency, confirming that Russian anti-
money laundering legislation is a valid legal instrument even for combat-
ing such sophisticated organized crimes.
The development of anti-money laundering legislation in Russia has
come through a number of significant obstacles. For a period of time, the
Russian Federation strongly opposed the idea of anti-money laundering
legislation, and President Yeltsin personally vetoed one of the projects on
anti-money laundering laws. Experts think that Russia's general inability
to detect and to prosecute money laundering activities was created inten-
YUKOS, Al Index EUR 46/012/2005, Apr. 11, 2005, available at http://web.amnesty.org/
library/print/ENGEUR460122005; Schor, supra note 18.
37. See Yukos Oil Co. v. Russian Federation (In re Yukos Oil Co.), 320 B.R. 130,
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004); Kurt A. Mayr, Enforcing Prepackaged Restructurings of Foreign
Debtors under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 469 (2006); Kurt A.
Mayr, A Tale of Two Proceedings: "Turnabout Is Fair Play" in the YUKOS U.S. Bankruptcy
Cases, 25(6) AM. BANKR. INST. J. 24, 24-29 (July/Aug. 2006) [hereinafter Two Proceedings].
38. See, e.g., Mayr, Two Proceedings, supra note 37, at 1, 3; Matteo Winkler, Arbitra-
tion without Privity and Russian Oil: The Yukos Case before the Houston Court, 27 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 115, 117 (2006).
39. Philip Baker, Recent Tax Cases From Strasbourg, 828 (5) TAX J., 4 (2006).
40. Russian Capitalism and Money-Laundering, supra note 16, at 1.
41. See Russian Capitalism and Money-Laundering, supra note 16, at 21.
42. See Russian Capitalism and Money-Laundering, supra note 16, at 7.
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tionally, and permitted former members of the Soviet governmental ap-
paratus to legitimize their embezzled funds. 3
In 1996, the Russian Federation enacted a new criminal code that
criminalized money laundering." The Code was a product of both the
need to address the changing social, political, and economic conditions
of contemporary Russian society, and the need to confront the drastic
increase in post-Soviet crime. 45 Article 174 of the Russian Criminal
Code, entitled "Legalization of Money (Money-Laundering) or of Any
Other Assets Acquired Illegally, 49 criminalizes financial transactions
involving assets that have been acquired by illegal methods.46 Academics
understand Article 174 only as a skeletal provision. Stated another way,
"'[the CCRF's] primary importance is as a theoretical normative state-
ment' . .. the new code announces the principles under which Russians
one day hope to live. 47
On July 13, 2001, the Duma, proceeding with the fight against
money laundering in Russia, passed an anti-money laundering bill.48 The
law, as adopted, came into effect in February 2002. 49 This law, which
amended the Russian Criminal Code, established the general anti-money
laundering framework in Russia. The current legislation defines the
offence of money laundering as "the performance, for large amounts and
with the aim of giving a legal appearance to their possession, use and
disposal, of financial and other transactions with monetary funds and
other assets which are known to have been acquired by other persons
through criminal means (with the exception of the offences defined in
43. Sam Chung, Criminalizing Money Laundering as a Method and Means of Curbing
Corruption, Organized Crime, and Capital Flight in Russia, 8 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J., 617,
623, 628 (1999).
44. Ugolovnyi Kodeks RF [UK] [The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation] No.
63-FZ (Russ.).
45. See William Burnham, The New Russian Criminal Code: A Window onto Democ-
ratic Russia, 26 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L., 365, 365 (2000).
46. CCRF Art. 174
47. Suzanne Possehl, New Crime and Punishment, 82 A.B.A. J. 72, 73 (1996).
48. The FATF Review to Identify Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories concluded
with respect to Russia the following: "Currently the most critical barrier to improving its
money laundering regime is the lack of comprehensive anti-money laundering law and imple-
menting regulations which meet international standards. In particular, Russia lacks:
comprehensive customer identification requirements; a suspicious transaction reporting sys-
tem; a fully operational FlU with adequate resources; and effective and timely procedures for
providing evidence to assist in foreign money laundering prosecutions." Fin. Action Task
Force on Money Laundering [FATFI, Review to Identify Non-Cooperative Countries or Terri-
tories: Increasing the Worldwide Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Measures, at 13
(June 22, 2001), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/56/41/33922055.pdf.
49. Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Collection of Legislation
of the Russian Federation] 2001, No. 121-FZ.
50. The Act was later amended several times and found its development in the decrees
of the President, act of Government and regulations of the FIU and the Central Bank.
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articles 195, 194, 198 and 199 of this Code)."' This definition applies to
offenses under both Russian Criminal Code Article 174 and Article
174.1. Article 174 pertains to laundering operations conducted by a per-
son who was not involved in the predicate offense, while Article 174.1
deals with laundering operations conducted by the same person who
committed the predicate offense. 2
Some core characteristics can be gleaned from this framework. For
example, the definition of laundering offenses under the Russian Crimi-
nal Code remains rather broad since the notion of "crime" under Russian
law includes all criminal offenses irrespective of their gravity. 3 The pre-
vious definition did not make the offense dependent on the purpose of
disguising the criminal origin of the money. However, the words
"through illegal means" were replaced by "through criminal means." The
replacement signifies that only criminal offenses (offenses defined by the
Russian Criminal Code) may be regarded as giving origin to illicit
funds .54
Under the definition for money laundering, the word "knowingly"
restricts the possible application of the articles 174-174.1. Therefore,
money laundering offenses are restricted to those that have been commit-
ted intentionally, with negligence not being sufficient.5 In addition,
according to experts, Article 6 of the Russian anti-money laundering bill
is rather comprehensive in nature. It covers almost all activities com-
monly associated with money laundering. 6
In assessing the Russian anti-money laundering framework, experts
have pointed out that the definition of the offense seems to meet mini-
mum standards set by the Strasbourg Convention57  and the
Recommendations of the OECD Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering (FATF) 8 The experts believe that Russia is moving towards
a comprehensive anti-money-laundering regime. 9
51. Ugolovnyi Kodeks RF [Criminal Code] arts. 174 (Russ.).
52. Ugolovnyi Kodeks RF [Criminal Code] arts. 174-174.1 (Russ.).
53. See Burnham, supra note 45, at 367-68. It further excluded offences defined by
articles 193, 194, 198 and 199 of the Criminal Code, i.e. the failure to repatriate funds in ac-
cordance with exchange control regulations, avoidance of the payment of taxes and customs
duties (smuggling, however, remains a money laundering offence). Ugolovnyi Kodeks RF
[Criminal Code] arts. 193-94, 198-99 (Russ.).
54. Markus Schaer, New Russian Money Laundering Legislation, 29 INT'L Bus. LAW.
369, 369-70 (2001).
55. Chung, supra note 43, at 632.
56. See Chung, supra note 43, at 634.
57. See Council of Europe, Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confisca-
tion of the Proceeds from Crime, arts. 1, 6, Nov. 8, 1990, Europ. T.S. No. 141.
58. See Schaer, supra note 54, at 370.
59. See Olga Sher, Breaking the Wash Cycle: New Money Laundering Laws in Russia,
22 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & ComP. L. 627, 627-46 (2003).
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However, as analysts have noted, defining the crime of money laun-
dering in the Russian context has crystallized the moral issues at stake in
implementing international recommendations. The decision on whether
to integrate forms of economic delinquency common within the Russian
business community could radically modify the objectives of anti-money
laundering and the definition of its targets. 6° Favarel-Garrigues pointed
out the following:
In analyzing the case of Russia, I wish to show that the imple-
mentation of international standards against money laundering
does not necessarily imply a commitment to common values, or
even to a common vision of the objectives of this campaign. The
Russian example highlights, on the contrary, the latitude af-
forded to states to define the moral issues at stake in efforts to
combat money laundering within their borders, in accordance
with domestic concerns.6 '
A number of factors support the hypothesis that the anti-
laundering mechanism constitutes a valuable resource in the po-
litical management of the business community. Its
instrumentalization is wholly in line with government action
based on the exploitation of the legal vulnerability of Russian
economic and financial elites.62
His assumption, that a regulatory instrument such as money laundering
legislation could be used to crack down on certain personalities and ul-
timately be used to intimidate the business community by centralizing
information on bank transactions and institutions, is strongly supported
by the recent Russian criminal cases. 64
60. Gilles Favarel-Garigues, Domestic Reformulation of the Moral Issues at Stake in
the Drive against Money Laundering: The Case of Russia, 57/185 INT'L SOC. Sci. J. 529,
529-40 (2005).
61. Id. at 529.
62. Id. at 538.
63. Id.
64. See Linshits Accused of Money Laundering, BANKI.RU, Jan. 31, 2006,
http://www.banki.ru/news/engnews/?ID=123940 (reporting that the General Prosecutor's Of-
fice has accused Igor Linshits, board chairman of the Neftyanoi bank, of unlawful banking
activities and money laundering). The recent scandal pertaining to the application of anti-
money laundering regulations in the Russian banking industry also raises the question of using
the AML legislation for corruption and preferential treatment. See David Nowak, Frenkel:
Central Bank Dirty, ST. PETERSBURG IMES (Russ.), Jan. 23, 2007, available at http://www.
sptimes.ru/index.php?action-id=2&story_id= 20096; Suspect in Central Banker Murder
Alleges CB Money Laundering, RIA NoVOSTI, Jan 19, 2007, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070119/
59374920.html.
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The core message from this brief overview of contemporary Russian
anti-money laundering legislation is that, by the time of Mikhail
Khodorkovsky arrest and the commencement of the Yukos case, the core
provisions of Russia's anti-money laundering legislation had already
been enacted. Of course, the legislation had not been developed enough
in several important aspects, such as a comprehensive customer identifi-
cation requirements, a suspicious transaction reporting system and an
operational Federal Investigation Unit (FIU) with adequate resources,
but the main elements were in place and generally complied with the
main international guidelines. 65 The "backbone" provisions were in place
and reflected in case law.6
IV. PRINCIPLES OF THE KHODORKOVSKY/YUKOS
MONEY LAUNDERING CASE
It is important to note that the Yukos case has two dimensions. The
first is criminal and stems from the "First Khodorkovsky/Yukos Case"
(hereinafter the First Case), when Khodorkovsky was charged with,
among other charges, organizing and managing a network of shell com-
panies that were designed and used for the purpose of corporate tax
• 67
evasion. This dimension migrated from the First Khodorkovsky/Yukos
Case to the Second Khodorkovsky/Yukos Case (hereinafter the Second
Case), where the organization and management of the offshore and on-
shore shell companies network were assessed as an episode of organized
criminal activity that involved fraud and money laundering.68
65. See FATF, Public Statement: Progress Report on Non-Cooperative Countries and
Territories, at 4, (Feb. 1, 2001), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/36/23/35689966.pdf (re-
porting that Russian officials have stated that they intend to introduce counter-money
laundering legislation). In October 2002, the FATF removed four countries, including Russia,
from the NCCT list. FATF, Russia, Dominica, Niue, and Marshall Islands removed from
FATF's list of noncooperative countries and territories, (Oct. 11, 2002), http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/45/31/33693981 .pdf.
66. See Biulettin' Verkohnogo Suda RF [BVS] [Bulletin of the Supreme Court of the
Russian Federation] 2005, No. 1 at 2-6.
67. See Judgment, supra note 35, at 4-5, 44-45, 52-53, 485-524; Obvinitel'noe Zak-
liuchenie po Obvineniiu Lebedeva Platona Leonidovicha v Sovershenii Prestuplenii
(Meshchanskii Raionny Sud, G. Moskvy, 2005) [Bill of Indictment for Lebedev Platon Leoni-
dovich (Meshchansky Dist. Ct, City of Moscow, 2005)] 13-15, 43-47, 485-524, available at
http://www.khodorkovsky.m/docs/1174 Obvinitel noe zaklyuchenieLebedeva.doc [herein-
after Indictment]; Clateman, Summary and Analysis, supra note 8; SANFORD M. SAUNDERS,
JR., A. JOHN PAPPALARDO & MARIA P. LOGAN, ANALYSIS OF THE CRIMINAL CHARGES
AGAINST AND THE TRIAL OF MIKHAIL B. KHODORKOVSKY AND PLATON LEBEDEV, 14-20
(May 29, 2005), http://khodorkovsky.ru/docs/2620 analysis.pdf.
68. See The Summary of the Charges, supra note 15; Court Decision (Meshansky Dist.
C., City of Moscow, May 16, 2005).
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The second dimension of the Yukos case only deals with the taxation
of Yukos as a corporate group. The claims of the Ministry of Tax and
Levies, amounting to 27 billion U.S. dollars, are based on the assump-
tion that the same network of shell companies, which was allegedly used
for laundering funds, was also used for corporate tax evasion.6 ' There-
fore, the money laundering charges and corporate tax claims originate
from the same source: the Yukos corporate group structure and tax opti-
mization schemes through the creation of the shell companies network.
In the Yukos case, the prosecutors have actually created a new con-
cept in Russian criminal law known as the "criminal corporate group."
The criminal corporate group is a corporate group created for the pur-
poses of tax evasion and money laundering. It is managed by a group of
individuals recognized as an organized criminal group.7°
The strategy of the Russian prosecutors can be understood from the
comparative analysis of the Russian and U.S. legislation. The concept of
an "enterprise" in the United States' Federal Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)7' serves as a useful comparison to the
legal concept of an organized group as defined in the Russian Criminal
Code. As with the Russian Criminal Code's prohibition of illegal activity
by an organized group, RICO too is directed at combating organized
crime. In each case, the government must establish a nexus between the
alleged criminal activities and some enterprise or organized group. Al-
though the structure of a RICO enterprise can be either a formal, legal
entity or an informal association, RICO requires in the first instance that
the government allege and prove a structure for the making of decisions,
separate and apart from the alleged racketeering activities, with the exis-
tence of an enterprise being a separate element, which must be proved by
the prosecution. In addition, to prove a criminal association in fact, the
government must prove that "the various associates function as a con-
tinuing unit" for a "common purpose of engaging in a course of
conduct" Here too, the concept of an organized group in the Russian
Criminal Code is similar to the notion of a RICO enterprise, with its sta-
bility requirement echoing RICO's continuity, and its complicity
component mirroring common purpose, as to course of conduct.
72
69. See INCREMENTAL TAX ASSESSED, supra note 30; Pricewaterhouse Faces Claim in
Yukos Case, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2006, at A2; Press Release, Yukos Oil Company, Tax Slides
Update (Feb. 2005), 9, http://www.yukos.com/mp-upload/images/Ts-Feb-2005.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Tax Slides Update].
70. See, e.g., Lev Sigal, Organizovannaia Predprnimatel'skaia Gruppa, RUSSKI1
ZHURNAL [Organized Business Group, Russ. J.], May 14, 2005, http://www.russ.nilayout/
set/print//politics/docs/organizovannaya-predprinimatel-skaya.gruppa.
71. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1968 (1970).
72. SAUNDERS ET AL., supra note 67.
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However, in the Yukos case, the organized criminal group acquired
all the companies, including Yukos, and used these companies to organ-
ize the corporate group. Assimilated into the group, they also took the
managerial positions, drew several managers and employees into the or-
ganized group activity, made the company the production and corporate
leader of the Russian industry, almost bought Sibneft and merged with
Exxon-Mobil, and were ready to take power in Russia.73
This situation raises the question of how such a group could function
for seven years under the supervision of numerous controlling bodies on
a federal and regional level; since it was regarded as one of the top tax-
payers in the country, it had submitted thousands of pages of financial
reports and was audited by one of the top international auditing firms. 4
The answer to this question can be found in the analysis of the charges
recently brought against Mikhail Khodorkovsky and his allies.
The Yukos case also demonstrates that there is a tendency towards
the extensive and aggressive usage of the notorious Russian concept of
the "organized group" for the prosecution of those whose prosecution, in
other circumstances, would represent a difficult task.75
V. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CASE
The General Prosecutor's Office has published several important
documents concerning the First Case, including the Summary of the
Judgment.76 When the investigation of the Second Case had been fin-
ished, the General Prosecutor's Office published the Summary of the
73. See Perekrest, Part 1, supra note 18; see also Vladimir Perekrest, What Is Mikhail
Khodorkovsky Behind Bars for (Part 2), MATERIALS BELIEFS KNOWLEDGE, May 18, 2006,
http://prigovor.com/info/37303.htm; Vladimir Perekrest, What Is Mikhail Khodorkovsky Be-
hind Bars for (Part 3), MATERIALS BELIEFS KNOWLEDGE, June 7, 2006, http://prigovor.com
info/37304.html; Vladimir Perekrest, What Is Mikhail Khodorkovsky Behind Bars for (Part 4),
MATERIALS BELIEFS KNOWLEDGE, June 8, 2006, http://prigovor.com/info/37322.html; Vladi-
mir Perekrest, What Is Mikhail Khodorkovsky Behind Bars for (Part 5), MATERIALS BELIEFS
KNOWLEDGE, July 26, 2006, http://prigovor.com/info/37306.html.
74. The question is whether Yukos really represented a "corporate organized group" or
whether the existence of such a powerful business group was seen by the governing political
elite as an imminent threat to its power. Volkov, supra note 18.
75. Notably, there is a similar tendency growing in the United States, and this is high-
lighted by Gerard Lynch in his essay on RICO: "[P]rosecutors have seized on the virtually
unlimited sweep of the language of RICO to bring a wide variety of different prosecutions in
the form of RICO indictments." Gerard E. Lynch, Rico: The Crime of Being a Criminal Parts I
andH, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 661, 662 (1987).
76. E.g., Indictment, supra note 67; General Prosecutors Office of the Russian Federa-
tion, One More Case against Yukos Management, http://www.genproc.gov.ru/ru/news/
print.shtml?id=4488 (last visited Mar. 19, 2008).
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Charges brought against Khodorkovsky and Lebedev on its official web-
site .77
The allegations against Khodorkovsky and his allies have several gen-
eral characteristics that follow not only from the Summary of the Charges,
but also from the judgment in the First Case,8 the decision concerning the
episode of the illegal privatization of Apatit,79 arbitration decisions on the
tax claims against Yukos, 0 and a number of other documents of lesser im-
portance.8' The characteristics are discussed below.
A. Timing
The organized criminal group headed by Khodorkovsky and Lebe-
dev was allegedly formed as a group before 1994 when it was involved
in the Apatit case.82 According to the Summary of the Charges, the
77. See The Summary of the Charges, supra note 15. They have been accused of em-
bezzlement by means of the large-scale misappropriation under Part 4 Article 160 of the
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, Ugolovnyi Kodeks [UK] [Criminal Code] art. 160
(Russ.)
78. See Judgment, supra note 35.
79. See Court Decision (Meshansky Dist. Ct., City of Moscow, May 16, 2005)
80. See Interregional Tax Inspection NI v. Yukos, A40-61058/04-141-1510 (Federal
Arbitration Court of Moscow Region, 2007).
81. See, e.g., Russ. Fed'n v. Khodorkovsky, Tr. of the Closing Argument by Def.'s
Att'y, April 5, 2005 (on file with author) [hereinafter April 5 Closing Argument]; Russ. Fed'n
v. Khodorkovsky, Tr. of the Closing Argument by Def.'s Att'y, April 6, 2005 (on file with
author) [hereinafter April 6 Closing Argument]; Letter from Sergey Pepeliaever J.D, Professor
of Financial Law at the State University Higher School of Economics, Member of the Presid-
ium of the Russian Tax Law Association, Aarina Ivlieva, J.D., Assistant Professor of
Administrative and Financial Law at the Law Department of the Moscow State University &
Ivan Khamenushko, J.D., Lecturer in Administrative and Financial Law at the Law Depart-
ment of the Moscow State University (Jan. 15, 2004), available at http://www.yukos.com/
taxes/final.pdf).
82. This case in understood as a core part of the First Case, as it unfolded around the
problem of fair privatization in Russia. The case began in 1994 when Bank Menatep and its
controlled companies won a tender for Apatit, Russia's largest fertilizer company. The gov-
ernment auction to privatize 20% of Apatit was won by Volna, a firm controlled by the
Menatep group. According to the tender, Volna paid $225,000 for the stock and had to invest
$283 million within a year in the development of the company and the city where the com-
pany was located (the "Investment Plan"). Volna failed to fulfill several material requirements
of the Investment Plan due to, among a number of other reasons, the fact that the conditions of
the Investment Plan were outdated and its fulfillment would lead to negative consequences for
the company and its investors. However, the authorities succeeded in terminating the sale and
purchase agreement in the Arbitration Court, so the share of Apatit had to be returned to the
state. By the time the court decision became enforceable, the notorious shares were resold to
other companies and could not be transferred back to the state. This series of events led to the
lengthy and fruitless dispute between the State, represented by the Federal Property Fund
(hereinafter the Fund), and the Menatep Group.
In 2002 the Menatep and Yukos officials reached a compromise agreement with the
Fund, under which a settlement was paid to the Fund in the amount of $15 million as consid-
eration for non-returned shares. Just before the attack on Yukos the Prosecutor General
conducted a special review of the Apatit privatization procedure and the results of the tender
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organized criminal group "[has] also been engaged in criminal activities
in the country's petroleum industry. '83  Therefore the "Menatep-
Rosprom-Yukos" group, due to the vast variety of interests (property, oil
production, banking), can be called a "diversified organized criminal
group." According to the General Prosecutor, the activities of the crimi-
nal group lasted from approximately 1993 until 2003. The activities of
the group arguably lasted even longer, since the members of the man-
agement allegedly controlled by Khodorkovsky left the company and
flew to London in October-November of 2 00 4 .'
B. General Information on the Criminal Activities
The prosecutors understand the whole story of the Mentap-Yukos-
Rosprom Group as a continuous criminal act that is focused on the mis-
appropriation of privatized assets85 and obtainment of illegal profit from
the misappropriated assets through tax evasion and money laundering
schemes.86 The assessment of the general activities of the Yukos Group
as a continuous criminal offence is confirmed by the amount of funds
allegedly laundered by the organized criminal group through Yukos.87
and reported no violations to the President. However, it did not prevent this episode from be-
ing dragged into the Yukos case. See Judgment, supra note 35, at 15-32; Russian Federation v.
M. B. Khokorkovsky, P. L. Lebedev, A. V. Kraynov (Court Decision in the part of accusation
of fraudulent acquisition of the shares of Open Stock Company <Apatit ) [2005]; Anthony
Latta, Khodorkovsky, Menatep, and Yukos, Moscow NEWS, Apr. 11, 2004, available at
http://www.iicas.org/2004en/25 03_an-en.htm; The Summary of the Bill of Indictment, MIK-
HAIL KHODORKOVSKY PRESS-CENTER, available at: http://www.khodorkovsky.info/trial/case/
133827.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2007).
83. The Summary of the Charges, supra note 15.
84. See The Summary of the Charges, supra note 15; Erin E. Arvedlund, Fearing
Prosecution by Kremlin, Top Executives of Yukos Leave Russia, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 26, 2004, at
Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/26/business/worldbusiness/26yukos.html?
_r=-l&oref=slogin; Erin E. Arvedlund, Top Yukos Executives, Including 2 Americans, Flee
Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2004, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/25/
business/worldbusiness/25cnd-yukos.html?%2338;ei=5090&%2338;en=3fef3 lc435e04206&
ex=1259125200&pagewanted=print&position=.
85. For example, "In 1998 Khodorkovski, Lebedev and the other members of the or-
ganised group conspired to acquire by criminal means a majority shareholding in the said
joint-stock company, for the purposes of which they acquired the shares of OAO Achinski
NPZ, OAO Novosibirskoye Predpriyatiye po Obespecheniyu Nefteproduktami, OAO
Tomsknefteprodukt, OAO Khakasnefteprodukt, OAO Tomskneftegeofizika and OAO
Tomskneft VNK, incorporated by the Russian government into the authorized capital of OAO
VNK (38% shareholding)." The Summary of the Charges, supra note 15.
86. See Yukos Bosses to Face New Charges, INDEPENDENT (UK), Jan. 17, 2007, at 18.
87. The total amount of money allegedly laundered by the organized group during the
period 1998 to 2004 was 487,402,487,523.59 rubles (approximately 19 billion USD) and
7,576,216,501.76 USD. Compare INCREMENTAL TAx ASSESSED, supra note 30, with Mikhail
Khodorkovsky, Chairman, Executive Comm., Bd. of Dirs., Yukos Presentation in London
(2003) (on file with author), at 1-21; Tax Slides Update, supra note 69.
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Even salaries and annual bonuses paid to the employees and managers
have been announced as a form of bribery:
Khodorkovski and Lebedev bribed those shareholders who were
not under their control and those members of the higher man-
agement (directive from the former shareholder in the person of
the state) who were likely to put up active resistance to their ne-
farious activities. The bribe took the form of the unlawful
payment of a bonus from the bank accounts of foreign compa-
nies under the control of Khodorkovski and Lebedev
It should be noted that no charges of bribery have been officially brought
against any managers of the group, so it is hardly possible to ascertain
either the nature of the chargers or the persons who can be potentially
charged.
C. Approach to Business and Corporate Operations
The investigation considers even formal actions undertaken in the
normal course of business and corporate activity as a part of the continu-
ous criminal offence. For example the corporate restructuring procedure
which took place in 19989 has been described in the Summary of the
Charges as follows:
In order to fulfill his criminal aspirations ... and obtain the right
to their strategic and operational direction, Khodorkovski, to-
gether with the members of the organised group, created
management companies controlled by them for OAO NK
YUKOS and OAO VNK. For which purpose, on the instructions
of Khodorkovski and the members of the organised group, the
commercial establishments under their control founded 000
[limited company] YUKOS-Moskva, which became the man-
agement company for OAO NK YUKOS. Similarly in 1998
ZAO [closed corporation] YUKOS Exploration and Production
(ZAO YUKOS EL) was created for the management of petro-
leum-extracting companies, and ZAO YUKOS Refining and
88. The Summary of the Charges, supra note 15.
89. See, e.g., Iji, supra note 1, at 20-22; Yousef-Martinek, Raphael Minder & Rahim
Rabimov, Yukos Oil, A Corporate Governance Success Story?, THE CHAZEN WEB JOURNAL
OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS (Fall 2003), http://wwwl.gsb.columbia.edu/mygsb/faculty/
research/pubfiles/715/Yukos%5Fproof%2Epdf.; Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Chairman & CEO of
Yukos Oil Co., Speech at the 2nd International Oil Summit in Paris: The Third Alternative
(Apr. 25, 2001), in YUKOS REVIEW 3 (May-June 2001) at 16-19.
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Marketing (ZAO YUKOS RM) for the management of petro-
leum processing companies.90
This approach enables the prosecution to construe any corporate action
as preparatory to further organized criminal activity.
D. Khodorkovsky's Position in the Corporate Group
Khodorkovsky's position in the legal entities named in the Summary
of the Charges is one of the key aspects of the First Case. In the First
Case his lawyers argued extensively that neither Khodorkovsky nor Le-
bedev controlled the corporate structure of the group of affiliated
companies (hereinafter the Corporate Group).9 ' The Summary does not
name all the posts taken up by Khodorkovsky, but it provides several
examples of the control that Khodorkovsky and his allies exercised over
the Corporate Group and the personnel.
FIGURE III
SUMMARY OF THE CHARGES ON KHODORKOVSKY'S
POSITIONS IN THE GROUP
Yukos Oil Company control "Khodorkovski and the other members of the organised group led
by him had acquired the right to the strategic management of
OAO YUKOS NK in 1996. 02
Yukos' subsidiaries control "[T]he organised group of persons led by Khodorkovski procured
the right to the strategic and operational management of the
petroleum-extracting subsidiaries. ,"
The personnel "The administrative personnel appointed by Khodorkovski and the
members of the organised group were mostly the former
employees of the Menatep Bank and ZAO Rosprom, which were
also used by the organised group to further their criminal
designs. ",
General position and the role "Khodorkovski and Lebedev, who ran OAO NK YUKOS and
after the formal resignation occupied leading positions on the managing bodies of the
company, and who had accumulated capital in the companies
under their control by misappropriating the assets of its
subsidiaries, withdrew from the managing bodies of OAO NK
YUKOS without losing control of the strategic management of the
company. "'
90. The Summary of the Charges, supra note 15.
91. April 5 Closing Argument, supra note 81; April 6 Closing Argument, supra note 81.
92. The Summary of the Charges, supra note 15.
93. The Summary of the Charges, supra note 15.
94. The Summary of the Charges, supra note 15.
95. The Summary of the Charges, supra note 15.
[Vol. 28:711
The Yukos Money Laundering Case
It is clear from the last paragraph of the Table that the prosecutors
have applied a concept similar to the U.S. concept of the "controlling
person," or the U.K. concept of the "shadow director," to both Khodork-
ovsky and Lebedev. Understanding of both concepts is important for the
analysis of the Yukos case in general, and the Second Case in particular.
Simon Plant and Michel Prior describe the concept of "shadow director"
in the following way: "Shadow directors arise from a statutory concept
created under the Companies Act in order to extend obligations of direc-
tors to persons who exercise the same kind of influence over the
company as appointed directors would do. They are, in effect, not real
directors and have no legal powers to act on the company's behalf.
' 96
Although a shadow director has no legal power, he wields consider-
able influence within the company while being somewhat immune from
accountability. They are "persons in accordance with whose instructions
the company's directors are accustomed to act; thus a shadow director
might be a significant shareholder or creditor of the company. A shadow
director has been described as one who 'lurks in the shadows, sheltering
behind others who, he claims, are the only directors of the company to
the exclusion of himself.' "9
Because a shadow director is not claimed by a company as a direc-
tor, in any litigation certain elements of his status as a shadow director
must be, "allege[d] and prove[n]: (1) who are the directors of the com-
pany, whether de facto or de jure; (2) that the defendant directed those
directors how to act in relation to the company or that he was one of the
persons who did so; (3) that those directors acted in accordance with
such directions; and (4) that they were accustomed so to act."98
Bradley contrasts duties and responsibilities of a shadow director
with the American concept of control person liability, which she consid-
ers much broader. She asserts that, "[c]ontrolling shareholders of
corporations in the United States may be subject to a duty of fair dealing
similar to the duties imposed on directors and officers of the corporation,
and breach of this duty will give rise to liability in the same way. Unlike
the liability imposed on shadow directors in Britain, this liability will not
arise only on insolvency of the corporation. Moreover, the liability is for
breach of a duty of loyalty rather than for breach of a duty of care. '99
96. See Simon Plant & Michel Prior, Officers' and Directors' Liability in the Context of
Insolvency, 28 INT'L Bus. LAW. 303, 304 (2000).
97. Caroline Bradley, Transatlantic Misunderstandings: Corporate Law and Societies,
53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 269, 294 (1999) (quoting Re: Hydrodan (Corby) Ltd. [1994] B.C.C. 161,
163 (Ch.)).
98. Caroline M. Hague, Directors: De Jure, De Facto, or Shadow, 28 H.K.L.J., 304,
307-08 (1998) (quoting Re: Hydrodan (Corby) Ltd. [1994] B.C.C. 161, 163 (Ch.)).
99. Bradley, supra note 97, at 295.
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This control person liability, according to Bradley has been espe-
cially important in enforcement of federal securities statutes, "which
impose liability for violations of those laws on control-persons as well as
on the persons directly responsible for the violations. When a person is
civilly liable under the Securities Act of 1933, the same liability applies
to '[e]very person who, by or through stock ownership, agency or other-
wise, or who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or
understanding with one or more other persons by or through stock own-
ership, agency, or otherwise, controls' the other person."''
It should be noted that several Yukos minority shareholders have
made an attempt to prove that certain controlling persons concealed the
risk of the Russian Federation taking action against Yukos by failing to
disclose: (1) that Yukos had employed an illegal tax evasion scheme
since 2000; and (2) that Khodorkovsky's political activity exposed the
Company to retribution from the current Russian government, but failed
to state a claim for primary liability. The Court, amongst other things,
remarked: "To make out a prima facie case of control person liability
under Section 20(a), 'a plaintiff must show a primary violation by the
controlled person and control of the primary violator by the targeted de-
fendant, and show that the controlling person was in some meaningful
sense a culpable participant in the fraud perpetrated by the controlled
person.' ,,'0'
The diagram below shows that they have proper grounds to prove
that Khodorkovsky had been the sole controlling individual for not only
for Yukos and Menatep Groups, but for the Open Russia Foundation as
well.' 2 By emphasizing Khodorkovsky's controlling and managerial
functions the prosecutors want to show that all the cash flows, either
within or outside the Yukos Corporate Group, were ultimately under the
control of Khodorkovsky, who knew of the money's illicit origin. By
100. Bradley, supra note 97, at 295.
101. In re Yukos Oil Sec. Litig., No. 04 Civ. 5243(WHP), 2006 WL 3026024 at *23
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006) (quoting SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1472 (2d Cir.
1996)).
102. The Open Russia Foundation, founded in 2001 by Yukos, was an "international,
independent, charitable organization, operating as a private endowment. The Foundation
support[ed] both academic institutions and not-for-profit organizations ... The Foundation
[was] the first Russian international corporate philanthropic foundation. It not only
support[ed] a broad range of educational projects, but also provide[d] funding for their
implementation." Open Russia Foundation, CENTER FOR MEDIA & DEMOCRACY,
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Open-RussiaFoundation (last visited Sept. 17,
2007). The Open Russia Foundation is still under investigation for alleged participation in
Khodorkovsky's money laundering schemes. C.J. Chivers, New Charges Against Imprisoned
Yukos Founder, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 5, 2007, at Al ,available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/
02/05/world/europe/05cnd-yukos.html?hp&ex=I 170738000&en= 17d2daff9c9476da&ei=5094&
partner=-homepage.
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introducing this concept, the prosecutors purported to demonstrate that
Khodorkovsky and other members of the organized criminal group ac-
tions were intentionally aiming at the continuous laundering of "dirty"
funds and their accumulation abroad.
FIGURE IV
KHODORKOVSKY'S POSITIONS IN THE GROUP AND OUTSIDE.
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Yukos-Moscow other four directors we eappointed by Yukos and fullycontrolled]
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Russian law does not directly recognize the concept of "shadow di-
rectorship" or the "controlling person" as they are recognized by the
United Kingdom and the United States, respectively. Article 56 of theCivil Code and Article 3 of the Federal Law on Joint Stock Companies,
103. For information on the offices held by Khodorkovsky, see Obvinitel'noe Zak-
lyuchenie po Obvineniyu Khodorkovskogo Mikhaila Borisovicha [Bill of Indictment for
Mikhail Borisovich Khodorkovsky (2003), http://www.khodorkovsky.ru/docs71 Obvinitel
noezaklyuchenieFIN.doc; see also Catherine Belton, No Individual Menatep Owners Left,
THE Moscow TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at 5; Catherine Belton et al., Yukos Shares Frozen as
Stakes Raised in Kremlin's War, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Russ.), Oct. 31, 2003, available at
http://www.sptimesrussia.com/index.php?action-id=2&story-id=l 11405 (information on
Khodorkovsky's role in the Menatep Group); YUKOS OIL CO., YUKOS 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 5
(2000), available at http://www.rustocks.com/put.phtml/yuks-2000.pdf; YUKOS OIL CO.,
YUKOS 2001 ANNUAL REPORT (2001), available at http://www.2001 .yukos.com/v. On the Open
Russia Foundation's involvement in money laundering see generally Amsterdam & Peroff,
supra note 9, at 36-37; Holly Manges Jones (2007), Russia Prosecutors File New Money
Laundering Charges Against Khodorkovsky, JURIST, Feb. 7, 2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/
paperchase/2007/02/russia-prosecutors-file-new-money.php; Oleg Shchedrov, Khodorkovsky
Charged with Money Laundering, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Feb 5, 2007, http://www.boston.com/
news/world/europe/artic les/2007/02/05/khodorkovsky-charged-wi th-money-launderi ng-i fax.
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however, provide that a person who is able to give orders to a company
can be held liable for the damages incurred in a course of the company's
bankruptcy if the bankruptcy arose from such orders.'04 By describing
Khodorkovsky's position inside and outside Yukos Group in detail and
stressing his actual managerial position, the investigation aims to solve
the threefold problem:
1) Proof of Khodorkovsky's actual position as head manager and
core owner of the Group before and after his formal resigna-
tion for the purpose of the ongoing criminal investigation and
the pending court hearing in Russia;
2) Creating proper grounds for the Yukos case in light of current
European anti-money laundering legislation. These grounds
include confiscation, seizure, and civil recovery provisions,
which may help the investigators to seize the funds allegedly
belonging to Menatep, Khodorkovsky, and his allies abroad;
3) Creating grounds for prospective civil actions against
Khodorkovsky internationally by additionally confirming his
role as the ultimate controlling person in the Group.
VI. THE CORE EPISODES OF THE KHODORKOVSKY/YUKOS
MONEY LAUNDERING CASE' °5
The Summary of the Charges for the Second Case represents a sec-
ondary document that summarizes the main points of the official charges
in a manner that the prosecution would like to present to the public. The
case, however, is extremely complicated from a legal perspective, spans
over a ten-year history of several dozens of companies, and is interre-
lated with quite a number of other corporate, tax, and criminal cases.
104. See Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] art. 56 (Russ.); Federal'nyi Zakon
"Ob Aktsionemykh Obshchestvakh" N 208-FZ [The Federal Law "On Joint Stock Compa-
nies" No. 208-FZ], Ros. gaz., Dec. 29, 2005, no. 246 [hereinafter The Federal Law on Joint
Stock Companies]; The Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of RF and the Plenum
of the Supreme Arbitration Court of RF N 4/8 from 02.04.97. "About some aspects of applica-
tion of the Federal Law "On joint stock companies" (in the edition of the Resolution of the
Plenum of the Supreme Court of RF N 5, and the Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme
Arbitration Court of RF N3 from 05.02.98), available at http://www.garant.ru/nav.php?pid=
286&ssid=89&mv=l (last visited Mar. 19, 2008).
105. The Summary of Charges also includes an episode on the illegal alienation of the
subsidiaries shares belonging to VNK, 54 percent stock of which was acquired by Yukos on
the privatization tender. However, this episode does not concern the main Yukos operational
schemes and does not represent the case that needs an in-depth analysis. The Summary of the
Charges, supra note 15.
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Therefore, the episodes in the money laundering case should be analyzed
in line with the corporate story of the Group and other significant data.
A. Creation of the On-Shore Networks of Shell-Companies
The prosecutors clearly see two stages in the development of the
Yukos's shell-company network. The first stage, which lasted approxi-
mately from 1997 to 2000, is characterized by using mostly shell
companies'06 registered in so-called "closed cities" or ZATOs,'07 which
were areas authorized to grant tax exemption to the companies produc-
ing something in their territory.' 8 The Summary of the Charges States:
Thus, between 1997 and 1998 in the closed community of
Lesnoi [one of the ZATOs] the subordinates of Khodorkovski,
Lebedev and the other members of the organised group regis-
tered at their instigation the following commercial organisations:
These organisations were essentially dummy legal entities, using
the movement through them of petroleum, petroleum products,
securities and cash as their raison d'&re. On behalf of these
dummy companies, which gave them the right of ownership of
106. During this period the secretarial services to the Company were provided by Peter
Bond and the holding and secretarial company Valmet Group Limited (Bermuda). See The
Summary of the Charges, supra note 15.
107. ZATO (zakrytye administrativno-territorial'nye obrazovaniya) or closed cities.
"ZATO are closed cities in several senses. They are physically closed in that there is often a
pre-fabricated concrete wall surrounding them with the city boundaries ignoring regional and
local administrative boundaries. Administratively, they are closed in that they require a permit
to visit, though this has become more lax in the post-Soviet era. Perhaps most importantly,
these company towns closely tied to the military industrial complex are budgetarily independ-
ent of the region in which they are located. Residents of a region, including finance officials,
often know little about public finance inside the ZATO and even deny their existence. Al-
though ZATO residents were able to live somewhat independently off the region in the Soviet
era, they now must use many public services of the region, though they contribute no money
to help support these services." Gregory Brock, Public Finance in the ZATO Archipelago, 50/6
EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES 1065, 1065 (1998).
108. Before Perestroika, military institutions and production units had been located in
these areas, and were authorized by Government decree to grant special tax benefits to com-
panies conducting production operations on their territory. On the problem of tax exemption
policy in Russia, see VLADIMIR SAMOYLENKO, INTERNATIONAL TAX AND INVESTMENT CEN-
TER, GOVERNMENT POLICIES IN REGARD TO INTERNAL TAX HAVENS IN RUSSIA 7 (2003); see
generally Brock, supra note 107, at 1065; Gregory Brock, The ZATO Archipelago Revisited-
Is the Federal Government Loosening Its Grip? A Research Note, 52(7) EUROPE-ASIA STUD-
IES 1349 (2000); Maria Ponomareva & Zhuravskaya Ekaterina, Federal Tax Arrears in Russia:
Liquidity problems, federal redistribution or regional resistance? 12(3) ECONOMICS OF TRAN-
SITION 373 (2004); VADIM RADAEV, INFORMAL INSTITUTION ARRANGEMENTS AND TAX
EVASION IN THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY (2001) http://www.isnie.org/ISNIE01/Papers0l/
radaev.pdf.
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the extracted petroleum, Khodorkovsky, Lebedev and the other
members of the organised group disposed of the petroleum as if
it were their personal property. '09
The key element of the scheme was the large-scale usage of so-called
"shell" or "dummy" companies. Before the Yukos case, this term had an
extremely rare application in Russian case law." The definition of a
"shell" or "front" company, given in the judgment of the Khodorkovsky
case, is the first comprehensive definition that sets the standards for Rus-
sian case law:"'
The companies ... had not actually possessed any functions or
features of a legal entity, envisaged by articles 48 through 50 of
the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, i.e.:
did not posses, manage or operate a separate property for
processing, storage and sale of crude oil and oil products,
" were not able to achieve and exercise their rights of property
on their own without the orders,
• were not able to perform their activity, the main objective of
which was to receive profit, since their activity was unprofit-
able,
* meant for the purposes of evasion of taxes by the oil-
production and oil-refining subsidiary enterprises of OAO
'NK 'YUKOS', engaged in sale of oil and oil products, and
profit-making organizations affiliated to it."2
109. The Summary of the Charges, supra note 15.
110. I. Degtiarev, Inostrannyi Kholding na Zashchite Rossiiskikh Aktivov, EKONOMIKA I
ZHIZN' [Overseas Holding in the Guarding of Russian Assets, ECON. & LIFE] May 2005 (on
file with author).
111. It should be noted that the same position has been expressed in the Yukos-related
tax cases. See Interregional Tax Inspection NJ, A40-61058/04-141-15 10; Tax Inspection N5 v.
ZAO "PwC," A40-77631/06-88-185, (Moscow City Arbitration Court, 2007); ARTEM ALEK-
SANDROVICH RODIONov, NALOGOVYE SKHEMY, ZA KOTORYE POSADILI KHODORKOVSKOGO
[TAX SCHEMES THAT LEAD KHODORKOVSKY TO PRISON] 58-68 (2005).
The position of Yukos regarding the shell companies: ".... Inspection Report alleges that
these 17 companies acted as front companies, although it is said in the Inspection Report that
all of them were duly registered and operated as autonomous legal entities. These companies
were duly registered for tax purposes as independent taxpayers. Saying that these companies
acted as front companies actually leads to ignoring the independent status of these legal enti-
ties..." SERGEY PEPELIAEVR ET. AL., TAX MINISTRY OF RussIA, OPINION REGARDING
COMPLIANCE WITH LEGISLATION OF INSPECTION REPORT No. 08-1/1 OF DECEMBER 29, 2003
(2004).
112. Judgment, supra note 35, at 40.
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The meaning of the term "shell company," as it is understood by the
Russian court, is close to its meaning in international case law."3 The
absence of consistent application of this definition, however, raises the
question of applying the rule of law in the Russian Federation in general,
and in the Yukos Case in particular.
'4
According to the Arbitration court decisions, the network of on-
shore companies was created and used mainly for the purpose of tax eva-
sion."5 Only after obtaining illegal profit derived from the tax evasion
operations could the network of "shell" companies be used for its secon-
dary purpose of laundering the illegal gains:"
6
... [E]vasion of OJSC NK YUKOS from payment of taxes re-
sulted in application of illegal tax evasion scheme, discovered
during performed traveling tax inspection of OJSC NK YUKOS.
22 entities were registered in territories with preferential taxa-
tion regime and semblance was created regarding their activity
of purchase and sale of oil and oil products, so that tax payment
obligation arose with these entities, rather than with OJSC NK
YUKOS. The mentioned entities unlawfully applied benefits and
hence did not pay taxes. Since it was established in the course of
the inspection that OJSC NK YUKOS is the actual owner of oil
and oil products, then the obligation to pay taxes to the budget,
unpaid from the amount of earnings received from sales of oil
and oil products, appeared with OJSC NK YUKOS."1
7
This dual approach, based on the recognition of the illicit nature of
Yukos's offshore and onshore company network, has actually allowed
the authorities to kill two birds with one stone. The tax side of the story
has led to the liquidation of the company and forced sale of its assets; the
money laundering aspect has led to new charges being brought against
its owners and managers.
113. See, e.g., Dmitry Gololobov and Joseph Tanega, Sham SPEs: Part 2-the Regula-
tory Gaps of International Accounting Standards Concerning the Consolidation of Special
Purpose Entities, 17 I.C.C.L.R. 369, 378-80 (2006); Aden R. Pavkov, Ghouls and God-
sends--a Critique of Reverse Merger Policy, 3 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 475, 501-03 (2006).
114. See Rodionov, supra note 69. The source perfectly illustrates that, regardless of the
questionable character of the tax optimization schemes used by Yukos, the same schemes were
employed by 90% of the big Russian corporate groups. See, e.g., OAO LUKOIL, CONSOLI-
DATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS As OF DECEMBER 31, 2001 AND 2000 AND FOR EACH OF THE
YEARS IN THE THREE YEAR PERIOD ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2001 (2002), available at
http://www.lukoil.com/materials/doc/reports/gaapFS2001 
-eng.pdf.
115. See Interregional Tax Inspection N1 v. Yukos (A40-61058/04-141-15 10); Rodionov,
supra note 69; RODIONOV, supra note I11.
116. This scheme sets up a perfect example of nexus between money laundering and tax
evasion.
117. Interregional Tax Inspection NJ v. Yukos (A40-61058/04-141-1510).
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FIGURE V
BUSINESS OPERATIONS AND CASH FLOW OF THE COMPANY
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As evidence of the second stage of network development, the prose-
cutors point out that by 2001, Khodorkovsky and the other members of
the organized group concentrated a huge amount of wealth in Russia and
in foreign companies under their control. Because of the criminal nature
of the accumulated capital and the intent to continue increasing that
capital, the group changed the system of petroleum misappropriation and
money laundering. As a result, they organized a new system of moving
oil and petroleum products via companies registered in the regions that
gave them tax breaks.' 8 For this purpose, the executives of the compa-
nies, controlled by the organized group, drew up appropriate agency
agreements, purchase and sale agreements, commissions, and other
118. Regions such as Evenkia and Mordovia.
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documents needed for the purchase and sale between oil and petroleum
products companies." 9 The key principles of the system, according to the
prosecutors, were, "false" publicity gained through the scheme of forced
changeability:
With the aim of concealing the bogus nature of the said compa-
nies from the tax and other regulatory authorities, the plan
worked out by Khodorkovsi and the other members of the organ-
ised group to misappropriate other people's wealth entrusted to
them made provision for the periodic renewal of the artificial
systems of sales of petroleum and petroleum products, i.e. the
regular replacement in these systems of just the dummy organi-
sations-the petroleum raiders-which were engaged in the
resale of petroleum and petroleum products to other organisa-
tions, including newly founded ones. "0
The investigators say that between 2001 and 2003 Khodorkovsky and
the other members of the organized group misappropriated 202,214,394
tons of petroleum from the main Yukos production subsidiaries, with a
total value of 27 billion U.S. dollars.1
2
'
B. Creation of the Off-Shore Network of Shell (dummy) Companies
The Summary of Charges provides that, for the purpose of legalizing
the misappropriated petroleum, Khodorkovsky acquired dummy compa-
nies abroad and through them created a network of foreign sales
organizations for oil and petroleum products based on the following pat-
tern: Yukos (or a dummy company registered in Russia in a preferential
tax assessment zone) sold oil and petroleum products to a controlled for-
eign company registered in Switzerland, which resold them to a
controlled foreign company registered offshore, which in turn, resold
them to an actual buyer at a foreign petroleum-processing plant.' 22 Ac-
cording to the Summary of the Charges,
119. See The Summary of the Charges, supra note 15.
120. See The Summary of the Charges, supra note 15.
121. See The Summary of the Charges, supra note 15.
122. See The Summary of the Charges, supra note 15; Yukos Finance Becomes the Sole
Holder of YUKOS Oil Trader Petroval (Switzerland), GATEWAY TO Russ., May 11, 2004,
http://www.gateway2russia.com/st/art 234512.php; YUKOS' Oil Trader Petroval No Longer
Expects To Receive Oil From Yugansk, INTERFIN TRADE NEWS, Jan. 21, 2005,
http://interfintrade.commain/news/company-news?n-id=927&PHPSESSID=67cc5648fa0b5c
75f20d9d780aa37610; Who Is the King of Baltic Chartering?, RIVERLAKE SHIPPING, Mar. 15,
2005, https://www.riverlake.ch/pages/news/news-29.php?back=archives; Press Release, Pol-
ski Koncern Naftowy Orlen S.A. (2002), Polski Koncern Nft The Term Contract Petroval SA
(Sept. 30, 2007), http://www.advfn.com/newsThe-term-contract-Petroval-SA_3929658.html.
On Yukos' structure see Figure VI.
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The objective of Khodorkovski, Lebedev and the other members
of the organised group was to mislead the regulatory authorities
and foreign businessmen by including in the network a foreign
company controlled by them and registered in Switzerland,
which was enough to impart an image of reliability and trust-
worthiness to OAO NK YUKOS operations involving the export
of petroleum and petroleum products.
23
Almost all major Russian companies use the same tax optimization
schemes. These schemes have never been a secret and have been ad-
dressed by several pieces of research commenting on Russian corporate
124governance problems. All Russian oil and gas corporations have net-
works of off-shore companies that reside primarily in the same
jurisdictions as Yukos.125 It is only in the case of Yukos that the creation
of several off-shore companies has been recognized as a constituent part
of the criminal offence. The information about the core off-shore com-
panies that were directly controlled by Yukos had been publicly
disclosed according to the regulations of the Federal Securities and Ex-
change Commission. Prosecutors and the courts that considered the
Yukos-related cases have not given any consideration at all to the public
disclosures. 1
26
123. The Summary of the Charges, supra note 15.
124. See generally ALEXEI GORIAEV & KONSTANTIN SONON, Is POLITICAL RISK COM-
PANY-SPECIFIC? THE MARKET SIDE OF THE Yukos AFFAIR (2005); SERGEI GURIEY ET AL,
Moscow: NES-CEFIR-IET, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN RUSSIAN INDUSTRY (2003); Iji, supra
note 1. On the problem of Sibneft and TNK-BP's tax optimization schemes, see "Nalogosbere-
gaiushchie" Skhemy ot Sibnefti, 2 MOSKOvsKU BUKHGALTER ["Tax Saving" Schemes from
Sibneft, 2 Moscow Accountant] (2004) (on file with author); Carl Mortished, BP Venture Pays
$1bn in Back Taxes as Russia Gets Tougher, TIMES ONLINE, Nov. 11, 2006, http://
business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry-sectors/natural-resources/article633558.ece.
125. As an example, see the structure of Alfa Group, Konsortsium Al'fa-Grupp [Consor-
tium Alfa-Group], http://www.alfagroup.ru/276/about.aspx.
126. See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING AND REPORT-
ING ISSUES at 98, 104, UNCTAD/ITE/TEB/2003/9, U.N. Sales No. E.04.II.D.11 (2004)
(comparing the quality of Russian disclosure and corporate governance practices with Interna-
tional Standards of Accounting and Reporting (ISAR) requirements); V.E. TISHCHENKOV,
000 "IUKOS-MOSKVA," SPISOK AFFILIROVANNYKH LITS [V.E. TISHENKOV, 000 "YuKos-
Moscow," LIST OF AFFILIATED PERSONS] (2003), http://www.yukos.m/files/1 0938/spisokL03.
1 l_03.pdf.
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FIGURE VI
THE OFFSHORE NETWORK OF YUKOS BEFORE THE COLLAPSE
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C. Using the Auditor's Opinion as a Shelter
According to the prosecutors, Khodorkovsky and his allies under-
took several steps to conceal the illegal character of the shell companies
network:
... Khodorkovsky and the members of the organised group de-
clared the balances of these dummy companies, which they
nominally referred to as operational companies, side by side
with the balances of their subsidiary petroleum-extracting and
petroleum-processing plants when presenting their financial
statements to the international auditors. Through this deception
127. See In re Petition of Edward K. Rebgun as Interim Receiver of Yukos Oil Company,
No. 06-B-10775-RDD (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), available at http://chapterl5.comcl5-
files/20061207/0032GispenDeclaration.pdf.
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they convinced everybody that the dummy companies were all
within the sphere of influence of OAO NK YUKOS1
28
Prosecutors argue that the auditor's opinion allowed the criminal scheme
to continue. Because the auditor provided a false opinion of no in-
fringement with regards to the sale of petroleum products, members of
the organized group continued to use a major portion of the sales funds
for their personal enrichment. Only a fraction of the funds was paid to
the production companies engaged in the petroleum extraction and proc-
essing. However, the Summary of Charges contains no evidence that
the funds accumulated on the balance of the corporate group as a con-
solidated company were used illegally or were in violation of the
appropriate corporate procedures. The absence of any significant viola-
tions has been confirmed by the consolidated accounts audits conducted
by PwC since the beginning of 1997." 0 Nevertheless, the charges are
based on the assumption that the consolidated accounts of the Company
are simply a method of concealing the embezzled and laundered funds.
PwC's opinion is considered as a tool for such concealment.'
The role of PwC in the collapse of Yukos and the auditor's alleged
involvement in the Yukos schemes had not been assessed in any way un-
til the Russian Ministry of Tax and Levies filed an unprecedented
application with the Moscow Arbitration Court. The filing claimed that
PwC's managers and employees had actual knowledge and directly fa-
cilitated in Yukos's fraudulent tax schemes. 32 The Moscow court sided
with accusations from Moscow city tax officials, who claimed that PwC
had aided Yukos in perpetrating tax evasion by covering up the com-
128. See The Summary of the Charges, supra note 15.
129. See The Summary of the Charges, supra note 15.
130. For an example of Yukos' accounts from 2000-2002, see generally OAO NK
YUKOS, CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (2000), available at http://www.yukos.
com/new-ir/pdf/Gaap2000.pdf; YUKOS OIL Co., U.S. GAAP CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS (2001), available at http://www.yukos.com/new-ir/pdf/Final-annual-financial_
statements.pdf [hereinafter YUKOS 2001]; YUKOS OIL Co., U.S. GAAP CONSOLIDATED
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (2002); available at http://www.yukos.compdf/Yukos GAAP-
2002_final.pdf [hereinafter YUKOS 2002].
131. The position of the investigators generally complies with paragraph seven of the
Resolution of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation's Plenary Session on 28 December
2004, which provides that people who facilitate tax crimes by providing intellectual assistance
in the form of advice are criminally liable as accomplices of the offence. Postanovlenie Ple-
numa Verkhovnogo Suda RF ot 28 Dekabria 2006 G. N. 64: "0 Praktike Primeneniia Sudami
Ugolovnogo Zakondatel'stva ob Otvetstvennosti za Nalogovye Prestupleniia," 7 [The Reso-
lution of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation's Plenary Session on Dec. 28 2006 No.
64: "On the Court Policy for the Application of Criminal Law in Tax Crimes," $ 7] (on file
with author).
132. See generally Elizabeth Judge & Tony Halpin, PWC Faces Court Action in Russia
over Yukos Audits, TIMES ONLINE, Dec. 28, 2006, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/
business/law/corporate/article 1 264576.ece.
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pany's tax shelter schemes and drawing up two different audit reports in
more than three years.'33 Accordingly, the court found that the audit
agreements between Yukos and PwC Audit for the years 2002-2004
were invalid because they constituted illegal and unethical deals under
the Civil Code of the Russian Federation. The court awarded the gov-
ernment 16.8 million rubles ($480,000) in restitution.'
This case is the first and only time when a company such as PwC
was recognized as an accomplice and facilitator of the Yukos schemes.'35
PwC, however, had used the same formula to describe the tax risk for all
its large clients in the Russian oil sector. The formula can be seen from
the table below.
133. The court case revealed that the firm had compiled two sets of accounts-one for
internal use, that warned of illegal actions taken by Yukos; and another for shareholders. See
Tax Inspection N5, A40-77631/06-88-185 (on file with the author).
134. Olga Pleshanova et al., Price WaterhouseCoopers Blamed in Yukos Tax Affair, KOMMER-
SANT, Mar. 21, 2007, http://kommersant.com/p751697/Yukos,_jPricewaterhouseCooperstaxes/.
135. Experts think that this unprecedented decision has been masterminded by one of the
groups in the Kremlin and has resulted in intensifying the continuing conflict between them.
This tendency can be seen from the attempts undertaken by the Supreme Arbitration Court to
"punish" the Moscow Arbitration court for the decision on the PwC-Yukos case. See Yelena
Komarova, PwC Appeal Likely to Be Sustained at Top Level, Moscow NEws, Apr. 13, 2007, at
14; Sergey Nenashev, VAC Primeniaet "Tipovoi Nabor Reidera" Chtoby Otstranit'
Nyneshnego Predsedatelya Moskovskogo Arbitrazhnogo Suda, Stavshego Slishkom Sil'nym i
Avtoritetnym [Supreme Arbitration Court Applies Raider Methods in Order to Push Aside
Incumbent Chairman of the Moscow Arbitration Court, Asserting Too Much Strength and
Authority], KOMPROMAT, Feb. 2, 2007, http://compromat.ru/main/sud/mosarb.htm; Vladimir
Solov'ev, Kto i Zachem Unichtozhaet Moskovskiy Arbitrazhnyy Sud? [Who and Why Destroy
the Moscow Arbitration Court?], KOMPOMAT, Mar. 28, 2007, http://compromat.ru/main/
sud/razdel.htm; Supreme Arbitration Winds up Moscow Subordinate, KOMMERSANT, Mar. 23,
2007, http://kommersant.com/p752477/Arbitrationcourt/.
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FIGURE VII
YUKOS AND TNK-BP US GAAP TAX RISK NOTES FOR 2002
Yukos TNK International Limited's
PwC PwC
Note 19: Commitments and Contingent Note 18: Commitments and Contingent
Liabilities. Taxation. Liabilities. Taxation.
Russian tax legislation is subject to varying Russian tax legislation is subject to varying
interpretations and periodic changes, which may interpretations and constant changes, which may
be retroactive. Further, the interpretation of tax be retroactive. Further, the interpretation of tax
legislation by tax authorities as applied to the legislation by tax authorities as applied to the
transactions and activities of the Company may transactions and activities of the Group may not
not coincide with that of management. As a coincide with that of management. As a result,
result, certain transactions may be challenged tax authorities may challenge transactions, and
by tax authorities and the Company may be the Group may be assessed additional taxes,
assessed additional taxes, penalties and penalties and interest. Tax periods remain open
interest, to review by the tax authorities for three years."
Consolidated tax returns are not required under
existing Russian tax legislation and tax audits
are performed on an individual entity basis only
Tax periods remain open to review by the tax
authorities for three years.'"_
Facing a significant threat of losing its Russian business and crimi-
nal charges against several key employees, PwC finally decided to
withdraw all of its Yukos audit reports.'39 The auditor said that it had
withdrawn Yukos's audits from 1996 to 2004 because of the discovery of
136. During 2004 and 2005 the Federal Tax Service performed tax audits on certain
subsidiaries of the Group, relating to their 2001 activities. In connection with these audits the
FTS has presented the Group tax acts totaling approximately USD 1,009 million (RR 28 bil-
lion), including penalties and interest. Among other items, these tax acts challenge the Group's
treatment of capital construction profits tax concession, transfer pricing and the use of reduced
rate tax economic zones. See TNK-BP LTD., TNK-BP LIMITED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2004 AND 2003 13, n. 18 (2004), available at www.tnk-
bp.com/common/en/investors/financialirNK-BPLimited_2004-signed.pdf. See also Miriam
Elder, TNK-BP Pays Off $1.44bln Tax Bill, THE Moscow TIMES, Nov. 13, 2006, available at
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2006/1 1/13/002.html; Russian Tax Claim on TNK-
BP Isn't Seen as a Repeat of Yukos, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Apr. 13, 2005, available at
http://www.iht.com/arficles/2005/04/12/business/yukos.php; Anna Skornyakova, TNK Causes
Troubles, KOMMERSANT, Aug. 11, 2007, available at http://www.kommersant.coml
p600251/TNKCausesTroubles/; Tax Claims on Russian Companies: Credit Cliff Risk or
Business as Usual?, STANDARD & POOR'S, Apr. 25, 2005; Tnk-Bp Disputes Tax Claim,
http://www.cbonds.info/cis/eng/comments/view-comment.php/params/id/l10226.
137. YUKOS 2002, supra note 130, at 25 (emphasis added).
138. TNK INT'L LTD., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 31 DECEMBER 2002 17
(2003) (emphasis added).
139. See Yukos Audits Withdrawn, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2007, at B2.
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new information that could have influenced those reports had it come to
light earlier.' 40 The firm said in a letter that was published on the firm's
Russian website that "PwC now believes that information and represen-
tations which were provided to PwC by Yukos's former management
may not have been accurate."' 4' The letter, sent on June 15 to Yukos's
liquidator, stated that PwC believes the Yukos management lied by de-
claring that its main trading structures, Baltic Petroleum, South
Petroleum, and Behles, were not affiliated with the company.'42 The letter
also provided three additional reasons for the unprecedented withdrawal:
(1) The Yukos management failed to provide enough information on
whether Russian entities later used by Yukos were in arm's-length trans-
actions with Yukos; (2) The management also failed to disclose
information on "significant payments" the company made to entities
owned by the shareholders of Menatep Bank, which collapsed during the
August 1998 financial crisis; and (3) The management failed to inform
the auditor about payments made by the Menatep Group to several Yukos
managers. 14 The reasons given by PwC correspond exactly with the
charges recently brought against Mikhail Khodorkovsky and his allies.
Russian legislation and judicial doctrines during 1993-2003 have
undergone more substantial changes than, for example, British legisla-
tion and case law have over the past two centuries.'" These substantial
changes enable any auditor to find numerous omissions and inaccuracies
in the data disclosed and repeat PwC's tactics. PwC's withdrawal deci-
sion has also been recognized by several experts as being driven
completely by political motivations. Thus the withdrawal decision is
likely to affect the Yukos case by, on the one hand, eliminating one of the
140. See PwC Withdraws YUKOS Reports, KOMMERSANT, June 25, 2007, http://
kommersant.com/p777543/PwC-YUKOS-Reports/.
141. Press Release, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Withdrawal of Yukos Audit Reports
(June 24, 2007), http://www.pwc.com/extweb/ncpressrelease.nsf/docid/FB66FD4D8CBB
5640802573050019EB74.
142. Irina Resnik et al., Chto Skryval YUKOS [What Yukos Concealed], 115 VEDOMOSTI,
June 26, 2007.
143. Letter of Withdrawal from PriceWaterhouseCoopers to Yukos Oil Co. (2007),
available at http://compromat.ru/main/hodorkovskiy/pwcotzyv2.htm.
144. For example, the Regulations on affiliated entities were approved by the Russian
Securities Market Regulator only in 1999. See Decision of the Federal Commission of the
Securities Market N 7 "On registration and information disclosure of affiliated persons" from
September 30, 1999 available at: Law of Russia in English / System GARANT
(http://www.garant.ru/nav. php?pid =286&ssid=89&mv=l). See Press Release, The Procu-
racy-General of the Russian Federation, Procuracy-General of the Russian Federation
completes investigation of criminal case with respect to Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon
Lebedev (Feb. 16, 2007) (on file with author).
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most powerful arguments of the defense and, on the other hand, provid-
ing the defense with more evidence of politically motivated influence.'
4 5
The PwC story is far from an end. Both parties will appeal to the
Supreme Arbitration Court, whose final ruling will set the precedent for
auditors' liability in Russia.
46
D. Accumulation of Profit on the Foreign Accounts
The key element of the charges is that, by organizing the Swiss com-
pany's sales of oil and petroleum products to the shell offshore company,
the organized group accumulated part of the money laundered through
the sale of misappropriated petroleum in their off-shore bank accounts.
This accumulation of funds in the off-shore bank accounts in turn re-
duced the tax burden on the Company's profits obtained via illegal
operations. The prosecutors claim that Khodorkovsky and the other
members of the organized group transferred funds from the bank ac-
counts of the "trading" shell companies to the bank accounts of the other
"financial" shell companies controlled by them. Subsequently, the organ-
ized group manipulated these funds for its own interests. 
47
A number of Russian companies employed offshore schemes and
fund-accumulation techniques.14 1 Moreover, structuring the corporate
145. See Tai Adelaja, PwC is Criticized for Pulling Yukos Audits, Moscow TIMES, June
26, 2007, available at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2007/06/26/046.html; see also
Olga Pleshanova, PricewaterhouseCoopers Discovers a Criminal Group, KOMMERSANT, June
26, 2007, http://www.kommersant.com/p777939/Big-Three-auditing/; Catherine Belton,
Yukos Chiefs Lied to Us, Claims PwC after It Withdraws Audits, FIN. TIMES, June 26, 2007, at
WORLD NEWS-US 2, available at http://www.ft.com/home/us.
146. PwC was "tried" under Article 169 of the Civil Code-citing "violation of the fun-
damental principles of law and order and morality." However, the international auditor found
an influential Russian backer in Anton Ivanov, the chairman of Russia's Supreme Arbitration
Court. "Market participants should be assured that there are basic principles which ought not
to be violated. If we apply Article 169 of the Civil Code without grounds, belief in the stability
of [business] contracts will be undermined," said Ivanov in a statement which appeared in the
media just a day before the Moscow Arbitration Court heard the case against PwC. Experts
and print media were quick to recognize in the statement an early, hidden hint to the court
regarding the PwC case's outcome. Yelena Komarova, PwC Appeal Likely to Be Sustained at
Top Level, Moscow NEWS WEEKLY, April 13, 2007, http://www.mnweekly.ru/business/
20070413/55150034.html.
147. The Summary of the Charges, supra note 15.
148. See Mikhail Tul'skii, Pochemu Roman Abramovich Perekachivaet za Granitsu po
$1 Mlrd. v God [Why Roman Abramovich Is Transferring Abroad One Billion Dollars a Year],
KOMPROMAT, Oct. 25, 2004, http://compromat.ru/main/abramovich/pokupki.htm (discussing
Sibneft schemes); Boris Utkin, Razvetvlennaia Set' dlia Realizatsii Skhem "Gramotnogo"
Yxoda ot Uplaty Nalogov "Al'fa-Grupp"-Odin iz Camykh Krupnykx Rossiiskikh Ychreditelei
Zarubezhnykh Offshornykh Kompanii [The Network for Tax Evasion: Alfa Group One of the
Biggest Settler of Overseas Offshore Companies], KOMPROMAT, Mar. 1, 2005,
http://compromat.ru/main/fridman/offshore.htm; Skhemu Biznesa I Nezakonnoi Otmyvki De-
neg Umperii Mikhaila Fridmana [The Business and Tax Evasion Scheme of Fridman's
Empire], KOMPROMAT, Sept. 25, 2003, http://compromat.ru/main/fridman/shema.htm; Grigorii
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group cash flow through offshore treasury companies is an internation-
ally recognized business practice.4 9 The prosecutors' approach to
business practice erodes the line between legal business operations and
illegal business practices, putting political prosecution issues on the
agenda.
E. Redistribution of the Illegal Profit through Shared
Re-distribution and Dividends
The prosecutors also charged that Khodorkovsky had redistributed
the share capital of the Menatep Group under the guise of official divi-
dend payments. The payments were made to the several members of the
organized group for the purpose of concealing their "remuneration" for
the crimes committed. The investigation claims that the payments had
the purpose of making the members of the organized group partners and
owners of shares in Yukos and other companies where the legalized
funds were kept.'5° These allegations imply that any redistribution of
shares in a holding company could be taken as concealment of illegal
operations inside the group.
F. Laundering Operations
In the Summary of Charges, the prosecutors have separately enu-
merated several laundering operations allegedly conducted by the
members of the organized group."5' The operations generally complied
with the publicly known business activities of the Company and its core
shareholder the Menatep Group. The bulk of these activities was respec-
tively disclosed in the quarterly and annual audits of the company
accounts. The list of "laundering" operations includes the following:
Sidorov, Deputaty Zaintersovalis' Ofshornymi Aristokratami [Deputies Became Interested in
the Offshore Aristocracy], KOMPROMAT, July 27, 2006, http://compromat.ru/main/fridman/
offsharist.htm.
149. See Gareth Green, Transfer Pricing Techniques for Group Treasury Companies, 12
INT'L TAX REv., 23, 24 (2001).
150. The Summary of the Charges, supra note 15.
151. See The Summary of the Charges, supra note 15.
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FIGURE VIII
THE TABLE OF THE MONEY LAUNDERING CHARGES
AND BUSINESS OPERATIONS COMPARISON
The Summary of Charges
Cancellation of the Menatep Bank's creditor
indebtedness to foreign banks, restructured on
Yukos, the money from which (credit) was used
by Khodorkovsky to acquire shares of Yukos
through the Menatep Group.
The Business Substance of Operations
In 1998 the Russian ruble collapsed, taking
Bank Menatep with it. '52 Its banking license was
revoked and a 32 percent holding in Yukos,
pledged on security of $233million, was taken
into possession by three banks: the Standard
Bank of South Africa, the Japanese Daiwa Bank
and Germany's Standard Bank."' According tc
the Moscow News, "Khodorkovsky urged the
banks to accept a three-year repayment plan
that would be secured by oil exports rather than
shares in Yukos, but the banks refused, taking
control of their shares in Yukos. Soon afterwards,
they dumped their shares, recovering only aboul
half of their loan?'
Subsequent to Bank MENATEP's bankruptcy in
1999 and continuing into 2000, Yukos entered
into a series of transactions, in which it acquired
the rights to collect from Bank MENATEP from
third party assignors." Through this procedure
the indebtedness of the Banks was restructured
and Yukos's shares were bought back. Similar
restructuring schemes were used by other
Russian business groups."
The transaction was fully disclosed in the Annual
Report for the Year 2000 (Note 8). ' This
voluntary buy-out scheme was quite evidently
aimed at mitigation of the adverse effects
incurred by the Bank MENATEP's clients and
had primarily a reputational goal.
152. See, e.g., ANATOMY OF THE 1998 RUSSIAN CRISIS (Vladimir Tikhomirov ed., 1999).
153. SALTER, supra note 7, at 6.
154. Anthony Latta, Khodorkovsky, Menatep, and Yukos, THE Moscow NEWS, Apr. 11
2004, at 1, available at http://english.mn.ru/english/issue.php?2004-11-2.
155. YUKOS OIL Co., supra note 103, at 45.
156. Tatyana Grishina & Maksim Builov, Banking 2000-2004, KOMMERSANT, June 7,
2004, http://www.kommersant.com/tree.asp?rubric=3&node=27&docid=480923.
157. YUKOS OIL Co., supra note 103, at 45.
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The Summary of Charges The Business Substance of Operations
Acquisition of euro-bonds and currency bonds The acquisition of different types of securities
from foreign companies to the amount of 1 billion has always been regarded as a conventional
U.S. dollars, which were transferred to the shell treasury and investment operation of any
companies controlled by the organized group. corporate group, which needs to invest the
temporary available funds."' For comparison
annual reports of any big Russian oil company
could be taken. TNK-BP Limited Consolidated
Financial Statements for 2004 provide that as of
December 31, 2004 and 2003 the Group had
approximately USD 700 million of Eurobonds
issued and outstanding."
The performance of various financial exchange The main argument against this claim is that all
operations to a total amount of more than 264 operations, enlisted in the Summary of Charges,
billion rubles, and the laundering of this money were simply transfers of funds inside a corporate
in the bank accounts of Russian and offshore group, without which it cannot function as a
company networks. group.The funds remained properly reflected in
The transferring of funds of offshore "shell" the Consolidated Financial Statements of the
companies, disguised as dividends, to a sum of Group, and all the operations with them were
more than 4.2 billion U.S. dollars, into the bank conducted in accordance with the centralized
accounts. financial policy and relevant internal regulations.
The legitimacy of intra-group transfers is
recognized internationally and subject to the
anti-avoidance rules. 6'
For example, the Rosneft Consolidated Financial
Statements for the years 2003, 2004, 2005
provide: "....the guarantee obligations of OJSC
Yuganskneftegaz with respect to the loan
described above have become intercompany in
nature."
158. YUKOS OIL Co., supra note 103, at 43; YUKOs 2001, supra note 130, at 6-8.
159. See TNK-BP LTD., TNK-BP LIMITED US GAAP CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS FOR FULL CALENDAR YEAR 2004, 8 (2005), http://www.tnk-
bp.com/common/en/investors/financial/TNK-BP_Limited_2004_signed.pdf.
160. For a comparison with Yukos's reports, the TNK-BP reports can be taken. See id.;
TNK INT'L LTD., supra note 138; Miriam Elder, TNK-BP Pays Off $1.44Bln Tax Bill, THE
Moscow TIMES, Nov. 13, 2006, at 4, available at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/
stories/2006/11/13/002.html; Carl Mortished (2006), BP Venture Pays $Jbn in Back Taxes as
Russia Gets Tougher, TIMES, Nov. 11, 2006, available at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/
tol/business/industry-sectors/naturalresources/article633558.ece; Anna Skornyakova, TNK
Causes Troubles, KOMMERSANT (Moscow), Aug. 11, 2005, http://www.kommersant.com/
t60025 I /r_3/n_38/TNKCausesTroubles/; TNK-BP Obviniaiut v Ykhode ot Nalogov po
Skheme IUKOSa, ObSHCHIA GAZETA [TNK-BP Charged with Yukos Tax Avoidance Scheme,
GENERAL NEWSPAPER] (Moscow), June 24, 2007, http://www.og.ru/news/2007/06/27/
30417.shtml.
161. See COLIN G. DAVIS AND DARON GUNSON, SQUIRES: TAX PLANNING FOR GROUPS
OF COMPANIES 1102 (2006).
162. ROSNEFT OIL CO., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS YEARS ENDED DECEM-
BER 31, 2005, 2004 AND 2003 WITH REPORT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS 52 (2006), available
at http://www.rustocks.com/put.phtm/rsnt_2005-GAAP.pdf.
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The Summary of Charges The Business Substance of Operations
Transferring funds amounting to 2.8 billion U.S. The prosecutors aim to represent the treasury
dollars as credits from the offshore "shell" operations, i.e. intra-company loans common for
companies to Yukos and its subsidiaries, any corporate group, as illegal activities."
The analysis of the Summary of Charges provides some surprising
results. Yukos as a corporate group has generally complied not only with
international business practice, but also with the practices of comparable
Russian companies. The language of the Summary does not show any
corporate restructuring transactions or business operations that cannot be
found in the accounts and reports of other Russian oil giants. The only
assumption that may be still used by the prosecutors is that the transfer
pricing schemes used by Yukos were so blatant that they may qualify as
embezzlement.
VI. TRANSFER PRICING ISSUES IN THE KHODORKOVSKY/YUKOS CASE
For the "Second Case," the prosecutors chose the model of the
predicate offense, which has never been used in the recent history of
Russian criminal justice. According to the prosecutors, every sale of
crude from Yukos's production companies to the shell trading companies
that was priced below market should be deemed as a predicate offence
for the further acts of laundering. Therefore, the prosecutor argued, the
transfer-pricing sales represent acts of embezzlement. As all operations
had been conducted under the alleged control of Khodorkovsky and the
other members of the organized criminal group, the following operations
with oil and funds represent a continuous series of money laundering
acts.'64
Initially, the investigators wanted to make their case against Yukos
by arguing that the production companies had overproduced oil. 65 The
163. For example, the same loan was provided to Mazeikiu Nafta. See YUKOS OIL CO.,
ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002 56 (2002), available at http://2002.yukos.com/
eng/downloads/YAR_2002.pdf. See also Gareth Green, Transfer Pricing Techniques for Group
Treasury Companies, INT'L TAX REV. (June 2001).
164. The Summary of the Charges, supra note 15.
165. See generally Maria Cherkasova & Yurii Dorokhov, Prigovorchiki v Stroiu: Dela
IUKOSa Postavleny no Potok [The Line of Sentences: The Yukos Cases are being put on the
Conveyor], KOMMERSANT, Apr. 27, 2005, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?
DocslD=573696; Pavel Anisimov Poshel po Tret'emu Delu [Third Case of Pavel Anisimov],
KOMMERSANT, June 21, 2006, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocslD=683946; Pro-
kuratura Tomskoi Oblasti Pred"iavila Upravliaiushchemu "Tomsknefti" C. Shmkevichu
Obvinenie v Prevyshenii Ustanovlennykh Urovnei Dobychi Nefti [Tomsk Prosecutors Charged
Tomskneft Manager Shimkevich with Overproduction of Oil], PRIME-TASS, Oct. 4, 2005,
http://www.prime-tass.ru/news/show.asp?id=536600&ct=news; Riski Beilina IU.A. [Beilin's
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offense of over-production, according to Russian criminal case law,
could qualify as illegal entrepreneurship that can be deemed a predicate
offence for further money laundering operations.' 66 However, the investi-
gators have declined to prosecute under this theory, as acts of illegal
entrepreneurship do not amount to a serious criminal offence in Russia,
and the prosecutors have obviously found them not completely suitable
for such a significant criminal case. 67 As Russian criminal law contains
tax crime exception provisions with respect to money laundering of-
fenses, the Summary of the Charges does not mention tax evasion issues,
describing the schemes used for the alleged corporate tax evasion as
schemes designed and used for money laundering. 61
The existence of tax crime exemptions in Russian Criminal Law
may be viewed as a repetition of a typical mistake made previously by
other countries. In earlier attempts to deal with laundering at an interna-
tional level, explicit exceptions were made for tax offenses. Many
jurisdictions do not have such a wide category of predicate offenses, and
exclude tax offenses. However, the problem of how to fight the nexus of
money laundering and tax evasion is currently being debated at an inter-
national level.
69
According to conventional understanding, "[t]ransfer pricing enables
a parent company to concentrate profits, to funnel profits to foreign sub-
sidiaries, to transfer profits to subsidiaries located in well-established tax
havens, or to simply evade taxes."'' 70 The arguments of the prosecutors
Risks], KOMPROMAT (Russ.), Sept. 12, 2005, http://www.compromat.ru/main/hodorkovskiy/
bejlin l.htm.
166. See Ugolovnyi Kodeks RF [Criminal Code] arts. 171, 174 (Russ.). See also V. K.
DUNYOV ET AL., KOMMENTARII K UGOLONOMU KODEKSU RossnIsKoI FEDERATSU1 [COMMENTS
TO THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION] art. 171, 174 (2005) (on file with
author); A.N. Guev, Kommentarii k Ugolovnomu Kodeksu Rossiiskoi Federatsii dlia Predpri-
matelei [Comments to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation for Entrepreneurs],
EKZAMEN, 2006, at arts. 171, 174 (on file with author).
167. See Ugolovnyi Kodeks RF [Criminal Code] art. 171 (Russ.). See also Guev, supra
note 166, at art. 171.
168. See Ugolovnyi Kodeks RF [Criminal Code] art. 174 (Russ.); The Summary of the
Charges, supra note 15.
169. See Peter Alldridge & Ann Mumford, Tax Evasion and the Proceeds of Crime Act
2002, 25 LEGAL STUD. 353, 361 (2005) (footnote omitted) ("The reasons are not difficult to
guess. Schemes to avoid tax frequently depend upon complex routings of deals without appar-
ent commercial rationale. Money movements under a tax avoidance scheme make money
movements that are laundering the profits of crime less easy to detect. If the law of taxation
could be altered in such a way as to discourage 'artificial' avoidance schemes then the laun-
dering disposals would no longer sit amidst their camouflage. This can be used as an argument
for general anti-avoidance rules.") (emphasis in original).
170. Toshihiko Shiobara, Oversights in Russia's Corporate Governance: The Case of the
Oil and Gas Industry, in DEPENDENT ON OIL AND GAS: RUSSIA'S INTEGRATION INTO THE
WORLD ECONOMY 85, 93 (Shinichiro Tabata ed., 2006).
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with regards to the Yukos tax schemes are based on the following as-
sumptions:
1) The sale and purchase agreement between Yukos-controlled
entities were false, as they named Yukos as a purchaser, when
it was not:
The agreements regarding the purchase and sale of petroleum
were bogus because they contained the false information that
OAO NK YUKOS was a purchaser of petroleum, whereas
Khodorkovski, Lebedev and their friends were perfectly well
aware that OAO NK YUKOS was not in fact a purchaser of pe-
troleum, and that the products of the petroleum-extracting
companies were shipped directly and independently to Russian
and foreign customers"'.
2) The price of oil and petroleum products was not at market
price and was determined by the members of the organized
group. It represented only the cost of extracting the raw mate-
rial and was on average 2-4 times lower than the market
price.1
3) The third argument was not expressly reflected in the Sum-
mary of the Charges, but it is seen from the Arbitration Court
decisions on the Yukos tax claims and concerns the public
auctions7 3 that were conducted by the company's production
subsidiaries for the oil produced. The auctions have been de-
clared sham, since they concealed the true nature of the
transaction, which was the sale of the crude to the Yukos'
shell trading companies for tax evasion purposes.174
Combining the above arguments with the arguments concerning
Khodorkovsky's ultimate managerial position in the Yukos Corporate
Group, the prosecutors came to the conclusion that the organized crimi-
nal group headed by Khodorkovsky had committed embezzlement of the
oil and funds of the company's production subsidiaries.
Two important preliminary remarks regarding structure of trading
operations of Russian holding companies have to be made, since the
state of the trading operations, from their creation and up until 2003, has
been complicated and confusing. The first deals with the structure of
Russian holding companies as business (corporate) groups functioning in
171. See The Summary of the Charges, supra note 15.
172. See The Summary of the Charges, supra note 15.
173. See infra Figure V.
174. See Interregional Tax Inspection NI, A40-61058/04-141-1510.
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the transition period. The second concerns the problem of transfer pric-
ing, the application of the "arms length" principle, and related problems
of taxation, which appear to have been be critical to the relationships
between the emerging business groups and the state.
The corporate structures of Russian holding companies (legally
termed "vertically integrated companies") were created in the course of
privatization during 1990s. These structures predetermined the design of
intra-holding and external trading schemes. Almost all Russian holdings
companies were incorporated as vertical corporate groups, in which the
head holding company quite commonly owned 50%+1 of the ordinary
voting shares.' 75 There were accordingly a large number of minority
shareholders in the subsidiaries who quite rightly demanded dividends
from the production companies where they held stock.176 The sharehold-
ers' demand for stock dividends strongly contradicted the very idea that
"virtually integrated holding companies" had to be profitable as consoli-
dated corporate groups. 77 Until 2006, there were no mechanisms for the
compulsory buyout of minority stock, and the lack of these mechanisms
put newly established corporate groups in an ambiguous position, where,
on the one hand, they did not want to pay shareholders (or potential
blackmailers) who tried to enforce their rights, and, on the other hand,
they had no legal means for the effective compulsory consolidation of
the minority stock at the level of the head company.'
78
The second observation of the trading operations of Russian holding
companies is the manner in which the transfer-pricing scheme was usu-
ally realized. Large-scale oil companies first sold the oil obtained from
their subsidiary oil producing companies to their affiliated companies,
which were registered in domestic offshore or preferential tax zones. The
sales were usually one-half to one-third lower than the international
price. The affiliated companies then sold the oil to their subsidiary refin-
eries at two-thirds the international prices. Therefore, most profits
175. Black et. al., supra note 2, at 1750-52 (discussing head holding companies' abso-
lute powers and how minority shareholders can have dividends taken away); Iji, supra note 1,
at 9; Sprenger, supra note 4, at 11-14. For a general description of Russian legislation on
holding companies, see IRENA SHITKINA, HOLDING COMPANIES: LEGAL AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE ISSUES 132-238 (2006).
176. See D.V. Gololobov & S.P. Bakhmina, Tri Etapa Razvitiia Kholdingovykh Kom-
panii v Neftianoi Otrasli [Three Stages of Development of Holding Companies in the Oil
Industry], LAwMIX (Moscow), http://www.lawmix.ru/comm.php?id=5607 (last visited Nov.
14, 2007); see also Iji, supra note 1, at 9-12.
177. DMITRY GOLOLOBOV, COMPANY V. SHAREHOLDER: GREENMAIL RESISTANCE
STRATEGIES 20-21 (2nd ed. 2004).
178. See SZ RF Jan. 9, 2006, No. 2, Art. 172. See also S. SAVCHUK & R. KADIKOV,
VOLUNTARY AND COMPULSORY BUY-OUT OF SHARES: PRACTICAL ASPECTS, (2007).
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accumulated in the affiliated companies were registered in domestic off-
shore or preferential tax zones.7 9
Transfer pricing rules were first introduced in Russia in 1999. Since
then the concept of an arm's length transaction has remained relatively
unchanged.8 The Russian transfer pricing rules are mainly contained in
Articles 20 ("related parties") and 40 ("principles of determining prices
of goods [work, services] for tax purposes") of the Russian Tax Code.''
The Code provides the Ministry of Tax and Levies with a mechanism
known internationally as price adjustment.8 2 The Russian Tax Code
codifies an arm's length method as the basis for determining corporate
income.' Although these provisions were introduced together with the
First Part of the Tax Code, a lack of judicial practice, the weakness of the
general tax administration, and general problems in the Russian Federa-
tion's economic system gave birth to a confusing system of statutory
willful blindness where big corporations paid taxes not on the basis of
the Tax Code, but in accordance with special agreements with the Minis-
try of Tax and Levies. The government in turn closed its eyes to the
universal application of questionable tax optimization schemes.
The weaknesses in the transfer-pricing legal framework played a
huge role in the Yukos tax case. Instead of adjusting the intra-group re-
sale prices used,' 85 the tax authorities were forced to apply and further
179. See Shiobara, supra note 170, at 93.
180. See Ruslan Vasutin & Yekaterina Kosheleva, Business Opinion, Russian Transfer
Pricing Rules: On the Verge of Change, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Russ.), Mar. 20, 2007, avail-
able at http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action-id=2&story-id=21057.
181. Svetlana Stroykova, Courts Extend Application of Russian Transfer Pricing Rules,
INT'L TAX REV. (Mar. 2006), available at http://www.intemationaltaxreview.cormV
default.asp?Page= 10&PUBID=35&ISS=21456&SID=616738&RetumPage=5.
182. Article 40 of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation prescribes some cases in
which the tax authorities have the right to control prices used in transactions. According to
clause 1, Article 40, the prices for taxes are applicable to the prices of goods, works, and ser-
vices, specified by transaction parties, supposing these prices correspond to the level of
market prices. In order to monitor whether this premise is fulfilled, the tax authorities are
given the right to check the legitimacy of transaction prices only in the following circum-
stances: (1) transactions between "interdependent" persons; (2) good exchange (barter)
transactions; (3) foreign trade transactions; and, (4) transactions where the level of prices used
by the taxpayer for identical goods fluctuates by more than 20 percent in either direction over
a relatively short period of time. Nalogovyi Kodeks [NK] [Tax Code] art. 40(l)-(2) (Russ.).
183. Nadia Havard, Comparative Analysis of Tax Incentives Provided by the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Russia to Domestic and Foreign Businesses, 67 ALBANY L.
REV. 1159, 1167 (2004).
184. See SAMOYLENKO, supra note 108, at 2-5; Daniel Treisman, Russia's Taxing Prob-
lem, 112 FOREIGN POL'Y 55, 55--64 (1998); Maxim Mironov, Economics of Spacemen:
Estimation of Tax Evasion in Russia 1-3 (Univ. of Chi. Graduate Sch. of Bus., Working Paper,
2006).
185. The prospective legislative developments will drastically change the previous
guidelines and bring them more in line with OECD standards. See generally Vasutin & Ko-
sheleva, supra note 180.
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develop a "bad-faith taxpayer" concept to penalize the company for tax
evasions.' Some commentators have made attempts to justify the appli-
cation of the unprecedented concept in the Yukos case:
The short conclusion ... is that the tax claims brought against
Yukos are based on schemes that would be considered blatant
tax evasion in most countries. As is common in blatant fraud or
tax cases, there may be a number of theories available to chal-
lenge the illegal behavior. The Russian Tax Authorities in fact
set forth a number of parallel theories for questioning these tax
schemes. The Tax Authorities clearly are using this case (along
with a number of other relatively recent cases) to signal that they
will use various legal tools that have not previously (or very
rarely) been used, although they are explicitly and implicitly
built into Russia's Civil Code, to prevent classical forms of
"abuse of rights" and "bad faith" behavior. The intent appears to
be to introduce a degree of "substance-over-form" thinking into
the enforcement of Russian tax law and to reign in some of the
more blatant forms of abuse that have been staples of "doing
business" in Russia in the post-Soviet period. There is little
doubt that such rules, which exist in just about every western ju-
risdiction in some form and are built into Russia's own law, will
eventually be applied in practice in Russia.'
87
However, an analysis of existing Russian case law shows that the
only legal basis for challenging the transfer pricing schemes would be
for the tax authorities to challenge the pricing in the agreements between
186. In the Yukos case, the Constitutional Court confirmed that the notion of a "bad-faith
taxpayer" does exist. However, it did not provide a definition. Since then, the concept of good
faith seems to have been developed for a particular meaning for tax purposes and the courts
have started to apply it in practice. Naturally, controversy has arisen. On April 24, 2006, the
Supreme Arbitration Court introduced a draft of the Information Letter called "Concerning
Circumstances Which Cast Doubt on a Taxpayer's Good Faith in Connection with the Resolu-
tion of Tax Disputes in Arbitration Courts." The letter offers an open list of circumstances
which may cast doubt on a taxpayer's good faith. In particular, this list includes the following:
I) the terms of transactions are not the most beneficial for a taxpayer;
2) accounting for transactions does not reflect their economic substance;
3) the alienation of assets and subsequent acquisition of rights to those assets.
4) transactions between related parties in connection with loans and the sale of
goods, work or services with the subsequent offset of mutual liabilities, caus-
ing a decrease in tax accruals;
5) a taxpayer conducts and accounts for only those operations which are directly
concerned with obtaining tax benefits, if the type of activity involved requires
that other operations be conducted as well.
Taxpayers'Good Faith Questioned, RUSSIAN TAX BRIEF (Ernst & Young), May 2006, at 3-4.
187. See Clateman, supra note 114, at 1-16.
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the Yukos production companies and to adjust the price paid by the shell
trading companies upward to market rates."' This would result in a re-
computation of the production subsidiary's taxes as if it had received
market price for its products. Under this theory, the tax claims would
have to be brought against the various Yukos production subsidiaries that
sold products at below-market prices, and not against Yukos." There-
fore, all the taxes of the corporate group imputed to Yukos should have
been respectively recalculated. However, the complexity and unpredict-
able results of this method (the complete recalculation might not have
given a figure sufficient for the forceful sale of the Yukos assets) ex-
cluded it from the agenda of the Russian authorities.
Russian corporate law generally demands the same arms length ap-
proach to transactions as Western and international corporate law do.' 9°
The special procedure of approving the related parties and major transac-
tions must be respectfully applied to all the transactions inside the
corporate groups.191
Due to the peculiarities of the Russian oil trading system, the appli-
cation of the fair market price rule faced significant problems. As the
export capacity of the Russian oil companies was restricted by the physi-
cal pumping capacity of the export pipeline that belongs to the state-
controlled company "Transneft," the oil companies were allowed to sell
approximately one third of the produced crude to overseas consumers.92
The rest of the oil had to be sold within the internal market or refined
and sold as products. 93 Therefore, there was the world fair market price,
fixed by the international rating agencies for overseas sales, and the in-
ternal fair market price for domestic sales.' 94 The internal market price
did not actually exist as there was no public exchange for oil contracts,
and the bulk of the oil was refined.
188. See Pepeliaev et al., supra note 111.
189. See Clateman, supra note 114.
190. See, e.g., SHITKINA, supra note 175, at 351-54; Roswell B. Perkins, The FCSM
Corporate Governance Code for Russian Companies, 16 TRANSNAT'L LAW 75, 99-100 (2002-
2003).
191. The Federal Law on Joint Stock Companies, supra note 104, at arts. 78-79, 81-84.
192. See SZ RF Jan. 9, 2005, No. 2, Art. 162. See also S. Sitnikov, Dogovor Transporti-
rovki Nefti Posredstvom Sistemy Magstral'hyx Hefteprovodov: Teoriia i Praktika
Pravopremeneniia [Oil Pipe Transportation Agreements: Theory and Practice], 5 VESTNIK
FEDERAL'NOGO ARBITRAZHNOGO SUDA ZAPADNO-SIBIRSKOGO OKRUGA [J. ARB. CT. E. SIBE-
RIAN REGION] (Sept.-Oct. 2005).
193. See Robert Corzine & John Thomhill, Oil Price Collapse Threatens Russian Econ-
omy, FIN. TIMES, March 19, 1998, at WORLD NEWS-EUROPE 2; Carl Mortished, Crude Oil
Falls as Russia Lifts Export Curbs, THE TIMES, May 18, 2002.
194. See Shiobara, supra note 170, at 96 ("In [sic] case of Yukos, the free sale price of its
subsidiary mining companies exceeded five times the transfer price of their affiliated refineries.").
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The lack of an internal market price could easily be explained by po-
litical factors: the internal price of oil was deemed a core
macroeconomic factor that determined the domestic prices of other
goods. If the price had not been indirectly controlled by statute, the
country would have faced a tremendous shock from rising prices. There-
fore, the artificial absence of an internal market price should be
understood as state policy, which, of course, suppressed the internal
market of oil and encouraged the application of the transfer pricing
schemes.
Both tax and corporate problems made application of the intra-group
tax and cash flow optimization schemes in 1996-2003 completely preva-
lent in the Russian Federation. 95 The line between optimization,
avoidance and evasion was unclear. The lack of clarity made the applica-
tion of the transfer pricing schemes, based on the complete disregard for
substance over form, a must for all big corporate groups."'
One of the reasons why transfer pricing schemes have become less
popular, apart from the consequences of the "Yukos Affair," is that
amendments have been made to the tax laws. The sales of mining miner-
als were targets of taxation until the introduction of the mining tax on
mineral resources at the beginning of 2002. The mining tax integrates a
user fee on underground resources, a deduction for reproducing minerals
and resource bases, and excise taxes on oil and gas. 97 The transfer pric-
ing methods could deduct 16 percent off 24 percent of the profit tax in
2003.98 Shiobara points out that "the incentive to underestimate sales has
also faded, because in 2002 the rate on taxable profit was reduced."' 99
The above arguments generally describe the situation that took place
in Russia between the early 90s and the beginning of the Yukos case.
They provide a foundation on which to understand the reasons why
Yukos, like many other production companies, aggressively incorporated
transfer pricing operations in its tax and cash flow optimization schemes.
Having reviewed the situation in Russia, it makes sense to take a
brief look at existing international practice, which considers transfer
pricing within the related groups of a corporation-one of the greatest
195. See Shiobara, supra note 170, at 95-101.
196. See SAMOYLENKO, supra note 108; Russia Risk: Tax Policy Risk, ECONOMIST
INTELLIGENCE UNIT LTD., July 27, 2007, http://www.viewswire.com/index.asp?layout=
RKArticleVW3&article_id= 1612423546&pagetitle=Latest+alerts.
197. See Shiobara, supra note 170, at 97.
198. See Shiobara, supra note 170, at 93.
199. In addition, since 2004, regional preferential privileges concerned with the profit
tax have been restricted within 4 percent points of 24 percent. See Shiobara, supra note 170, at
97.
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problems in international tax law.21 It is widely recognised that the arm's
length principle, as embodied in the model tax treaties and OECD
Guidelines, is "... almost universally accepted throughout the world.20°
This principle permits national tax authorities to adjust the accounts of
enterprises under common control, if the tax authorities consider that
"conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their
commercial or financial relations, which differ from those which would
be made between independent enterprises" in order to reallocate profit
which would have accrued but for those conditions.2 °2
By incorporating the separate entity concept, the arm's length prin-
ciple places related and unrelated enterprises on an equal footing for tax
purposes, thereby theoretically "avoiding the creation of tax advantages
or disadvantages that would otherwise distort the relative competitive
positions of either type of entity. 203 In practice, however, transfer pricing
disputes have "entailed negotiation and bargaining over the 'fair' profit
allocation.... Both officials and business representatives have continu-
ally tended to reject the possibility of developing explicit criteria for
profit allocation, and have preferred to focus on price adjustments."'2 4
The experience of tax authorities reveals the difficulty of allocating
profit by means of price adjustments. The British HM Revenue and Cus-
toms, which strongly advocated the separate accounting approach, uses
negotiation to agree to a reasonable basis for pricing.0 5 U.S. transfer
pricing is based on the arm's length standard and implies the separate
entity concept.c 6 It is recognized that "the U.S. rules against transfer-
200. See Elizabeth Chorvat, Forcing Multinationals to Play Fair: Proposals for a Rigor-
ous Transfer Pricing Theory, 54 ALA. L. REv. 1251, 1252 (2003).
201. Robert Ackerman & Elizabeth Chorvat, Modem Financial Theory and Transfer
Pricing, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 637, 640 (2002). See also Frances M. Homer, International
Cooperation and Understanding: What's New About the OECD's Transfer Pricing Guidelines,
50 U. MIAMI L. REv. 577, 577-78 (1995); John Neighbour & Jeffrey Owens, Transfer Pricing
in the New Millennium: Will the Arm's Length Principle Survive, 10 GEO. MASON L. REv.
951, 951-54 (2002).
202. See Sol Picciotto, Transfer Pricing and the Antinomies of Corporate Regulation, in
CORPORATE CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY 375, 398 (JOSEPH MCCAHERY ET AL., eds.,
1993); Eduardo Baistrocchi, The Transfer Pricing Problem: A Global Proposalfor Simplifica-
tion, 59 TAX LAW. 941, 952-54 (2005-2006) (quoting Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development); Chorvat, supra note 200, at 1255.
203. OECD, CoMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINA-
TIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX ADMINISTRATIONS 1.7 (1995). See also Org. for Econ. Coop.
and Dev. [OECD], The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Policy Brief 1-8,
OECD Doc. 1903291 (June 2001).
204. Picciotto, supra note 202, at 398.
205. Picciotto, supra note 202, at 398.
206. There are three traditional specified transactional methods set forth in the U.S.
transfer pricing regulations: comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) (or, in the case of intangi-
bles transfers, comparable uncontrolled transaction (CUT)), cost-plus, and resale price. The
CUP method uses prices in comparable transactions between or with unrelated third parties.
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pricing are inconsistent with modem business models, which organize
by process rather than by function. 20 7 In contrast with the U.K. ap-
proach, in the United States the procedures have become increasingly
juridified. 8 since the politicization of the problem in the 1960s.29 Ap-
proved in 1968, the regulations on transfer pricing defined five
categories of transaction (loans, services, leasing, intangibles, and tangi-
bles), and specified rules for determining prices for each.20 In addition,
"for each of the five categories of transactions the primary test of price
should be the 'comparable uncontrolled price' (CUP), which is the price
that would have been charged by uncontrolled parties dealing at arm's
length.",21' Regardless of the sophisticated legislative efforts, the problem
of transfer pricing remains problematic in the United States.22 Proposals
have been raised to use criminal legislation for ensuring effective en-
forcement.
213
In sum, although the existing international practice shows the impor-
tance and actual incontestability of the arm's length principle, the
legislative and political history in the United Kingdom and the United
States rules against transfer pricing clearly demonstrate that the rules
need a comprehensive and balanced approach that will inevitably include
element of negotiation between a taxpayer and the tax authorities. The
Yukos case does not set up an example of such approach.
Regardless of the legal, economic, and political arguments justifying
either the application of the Yukos transfer pricing schemes, or declaring
The cost plus method is used when the costs incurred for supplying a product are known. The
transfer price is then determined by adding a reasonable markup to the cost. The resale price
method is used when the ultimate sales price to arm's length third parties is known. Here, the
transfer price is determined by reducing the price by a reasonable markup. See ROBERT T.
COLE, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO U.S. TRANSFER PRICING 7.01 (3d ed., 2006).
207. Ackerman & Chorvat, supra note 201, at 637.
208. See Picciotto, supra note 202, at 403 (The procedure "also initiated by the US au-
thorities and on which considerable stress is being placed, is for 'advanced pricing agreement'
(APAs). This allows, at the taxpayer's initiative, the negotiation of an agreed transfer pricing
method which the tax authorities would accept, and which might remain valid, providing there
is no change in the key parameters identified in the agreement, for several years. Since the
procedure requires the same effort and level of disclosure as a contested audit, it is likely to be
initiated only by firms at high risk of tax scrutiny. However, political pressure has led to a
much more active programme of examination of TNCs, especially of foreign firms entering
the US market which are popularly suspected of not playing fair.").
209. Michael C. Durst & Robert E. Culbertson, Clearing Away the Sand: Retrospective
Methods and Prospective Documentation in Transfer Pricing Today, 57 TAX L. REV. 37, 47-
58 (2003).
210. Id. at 52-58.
211. Picciotto, supra note 202, at 399.
212. See Durst & Culbertson, supra note 209, at 134-35; Steven Harris & Paul B. Bums,
Transfer Pricing in the Post-Enron World, 13 INT'L TAX REv. 30, 30-31 (2002).
213. See generally, James D. Harmon, Jr., Rico Meets Keiretsu: A Response to Predatory
Transfer Pricing, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 3 (1992).
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them an essential element of blatant tax evasion, qualification of these
schemes as a form of embezzlement raises significant questions. Russian
legislation and case law consider embezzlement as an act of personal
misappropriation or transfer to a third person without any compensation
of the assets that have been entrusted to the offender.214 The assets may
also be under his control due to other legitimate reasons (agreement, or-
der, etc.) and he could exercise the rights of possession, management, or
delivery of these assets. The replacement of assets for less valuable ones
shall also be considered as embezzlement."' According to commentators,
the corpus delicti in the offense of embezzlement should involve the fol-
lowing characteristics:
1) The offender has the legal and official control over the certain
assets (he does not hold them illegally). This control may
originate from an agreement, power of attorney or orders of
the owner.
2) The offender has a legal right to alienate the assets to himself
or transfer assets to a third party. 6
Therefore, this legislative and case law approach in application of
the Khodorkovsky/Yukos case raises two important questions. The first
is whether a chief executive officer, a "shadow director," or an actual
controlling person of a managing company can be considered as a "con-
trolling person" as defined by Article 160 of the Russian Criminal Code
and Russian Case Law. Taking into consideration the language of the
Summary of the Charges, the position of commentators,2' 7 and the judg-
218
ments in the First Khodorkovsky case, this question could well be
214. Embezzlement by means of the large-scale misappropriation. The Summary of the
Charges, supra note 15.
215. Postanovlenie Plenuma Verkhovnogo Cuda CCCR ot 11 Iliulia 1972 G. N 4: "0
Cudebnoi Praktike po Delam o Khshcheniiakh Gosudarstvennogo i Obshchestvennogo
Imushchestva" [The Resolution of the Supreme Court Plenum of the U.S.S.R. on July 11,
1972 No. 4: "On the Court Policy on the embezzlement of governmental and public property"
(on file with author), available at http://www.garant.ru/nav.php?pid=286&ssid=89&mv=l.
216. DUYNOV ET AL., supra note 166, at art. 160.
217. Guev, supra note 166, at art. 160; V.M. ZHUIKOV & E.N. RENOV, VLAST I BIZNES:
VZAIMNAIA OTVETSTVENNOST'-KOMMENTARII K ZAKONODATEL'STVU [LAW AND BUSINESS:
MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITIES -COMMENTS TO THE LEGISLATION] art. 160 (2004); V.D. Larichev
& DV. Kudriavstev, Osobennosti Prestuplenii, Sovershaemykh Prkovoditeliami Bankov, AD-
VOKAT, Mart 2005 G [Characteristics of the Offenses Committed by Chief Bank Officers,
ADVOCAT, Mar. 2005], at 2-3 (on file with author); Valerii Belik, Za Chto Finansovogo Direk-
tora Mogut Privlech' k Ugolovnoi Otvetstvennosti, FINANSOVYI DIREKTOR No. 7-8, Iiul'-
Avgust 2006 [What Criminal Responsibilities Can They Call Financial Directors into Ac-
count, FIN. DIR. No. 7-8, July-Aug. 2006], http://www.fd.ru/article/21264.htnl.
218. That time he was sentenced for "embezzlement of other people's property entrusted
to the guilty party in large scale" regarding the Apatit trading scheme. Judgment, supra note
35, at 14. However, later, the Moscow City Court stated in its cassation decision that "the
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answered in the affirmative.2 9 However, this decision will set a precedent
for other Russian corporate groups and may urge them to make their
management structures more complex and opaque.
The second question is more important as potentially having a sig-
nificant impact on all the Russian business (corporate) groups. It can be
formulated as follows: Can transfer pricing transactions that are con-
ducted for the benefit of a parent company be considered as damaging
for a subsidiary that is fully owned by the parent?
This question is rather complicated, since in Russian case law the re-
sponsibility of the parent company for the damages caused to its fully
owned subsidiary as -a member of a multi-level corporate group is not
clear.22° Nevertheless, Article 71 of the Law on Joint Stock Companies
points out that either an individual manager or a managing company
owes the same general fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to the com-
pany they manage" ' as they owe under U.K. and U.S. law. 22 Article 6 of
the Law also fixes the responsibility of the parent company whose in-
structions have led to the insolvency of its subsidiary.223 The U.S. law
would give a similar answer to this question by using "separate entity,"
"limited liability," and "piercing veil" doctrines.
224
Concluding the part on the Yukos transfer-pricing problem, it is im-
portant to stress that all Russian oil companies used different transfer
apatit concentrate has not been entrusted to Khodorkovsky and Lebedev." Lebedev's Legal
Team Supervisory appeal to the Presidium of the Moscow City Court of December 26, 2005,
available at http://www.platonlebedev.ru/docs/default.asp?sid=2&mid=1478&open=l#doc.
This decision may create certain problems for the second case, but it is evident that this incon-
venient precedent can be easily overruled.
219. In the "Apatit episode" in the First Case the court used the formula "Mr. M. B.
Khodorkovsky, Mr. P. L. Lebedev acting as members of the organized group fraudulently
misappropriated shares in OAO 'Apatit' and, holding the major equity of the above company,
acquired the right to strategic and day to day management thereof by electing their subordi-
nates to the leading positions with OAO 'Apatit,' i.e. the Board of Directors and Director
General'" Taking into consideration the language, used in the Summary of the Chargers, the
similar approach will be used in the second "Khodorkovsky case." Judgment, supra note 35, at
14. See also infra Figure IV on the managing position of Khodorkovsky.
220. See SHITKINA, supra note 175, at 328, 412.
221. See The Federal Law on Joint Stock Companies, supra note 104, at art. 74. See also
E. Makeeva, Pravovye Kollizii Bnutri Kholdinga [Legal Collisions Inside Holding Compa-
nies], KONSUL'TANT No. 5, (Mar. 2005); Perkins, supra note 190, at 96-97.
222. See generally, A.E. MOLOTNIKOV, OTVETSTVENNOST' v AKTSIONERNYKH OB-
SHCHESTVAKH [ACCOUNTABILITY IN JOINT STOCK COMPANIES] (2006).
223. SHITKINA, supra note 175, at 316-329.
224. See I PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG ET AL., BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS pt. I & II,
(2d ed. 2007) (2005); PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG & KURT A. STRASSER, PROBLEMS OF PARENT AND
SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS UNDER STATUTORY LAW SPECIFICALLY APPLYING ENTERPRISE
PRINCIPLES § 32 (Kurt A. Strasser ed., 1992). See also Robert Charles Clark, The Regulation
of Financial Holding Companies, 92 HARV. L. REV. 787 (1979); E. Merrick Dodd, The Evolu-
tion of Limited Liability in American Industry: Massachusetts, 61 HARv. L. REV. 1351 (1947-
48); Kurt A. Strasser, Piercing the Veil in Corporate Groups, 37 CONN. L. REV. 637 (2005).
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pricing schemes which varied in the level of prices, types of shell com-
panies, etc. The new precedent, which is likely to be set in the new
Khodorkovsky/Yukos case, is sure to create a new legal threat for all
Russian production majors that will last at least for seven years. The new
precedent could also be used as an effective tool in a new wave of politi-
cally motivated redistribution of big property and industry in Russia.
CONCLUSION
A brief comparison of the Yukos corporate structure and business
operations with the recently brought money laundering charges shows
that similar allegations based on the creative application of the money
laundering legislation could be effectively brought against any corporate
group in Russia. The important point is that it could be done in full com-
pliance with the current Russian anti-money laundering legislation,
which is regarded by the international experts to be a consistent part of
the international anti money laundering framework.
This situation simultaneously raises several problems. The problem
stemming from applying national anti-money laundering legislation that
was adopted in compliance with international guidelines can be seen in
the context of countries with transitional economies. Multinational busi-
ness groups from such countries aim to conquer the international
securities markets and showed an unprecedented level of production and
capital growth. The majority of such corporations, acting primarily in the
oil, gas, and metal sectors, demonstrate a high level of compliance with
the most advanced international corporate governance and accounting
standards. They retain the best consultants, lawyers and auditors avail-
able in the market, who in turn assist the companies' stocks to become
blue chip shares.225 However, the Yukos case shows the general vulner-
ability of such compliance. The company, known in the international
business community as a leader that sets standards for a Russian corpo-
rate governance in transition, within months became an example of the
most outrageous corporate collapse in recent Russian history. This case
puts on the international agenda the question of whether advanced inter-
national corporate standards, even when meticulously complied with by
companies from countries with transitional economies, can protect inter-
national investors from unexpected scandals and losses. It also raises the
225. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, IPO WATCH EUROPE: REVIEW OF THE YEAR 2006
9-10 (2007); Arkady Ostrovsky, Russia's IPO Rush, FED. FIN. MARKETS SERVICE, July 19,
2005, http://www.fcsm.ru/eng/document.asp?obno= 18520.
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question of what role of the anti-money laundering legislation may play
in the promotion of such scandals. 6
The Yukos case has already given birth to a number of unprece-
dented decisions and is still creating precedents for international case
law. 7 More news is expected from the ECHR, where at least six Yukos-
related applications have been filed. There are two main questions which
are still outstanding and have to be addressed in the Yukos case: 1) The
role of the gatekeepers, including primarily the international auditors, in
the collapse of Yukos; and 2) the Russian government's political motiva-
tion and its significance for corporate cases where the criminal and
corporate tax evasion allegations were interrelated and used not only as
an attack on individuals, but also as an attack on their economic wealth,
which represented a danger for the existing political regime.
The battle unfolding in Russian courts surrounding PwC's involve-
ment and role in the Yukos case, even after its formal "surrender" to the
state, shows that the definite answer to the first question is likely to be
obtained only in a couple of years. 2" The answer to the second question
does not seem as evident as some experts are eager to represent it. The
position of Amnesty International, which has refused to declare
Khodorkovsky as a political prisoner, leaves a lot of room for further
discussion and stresses the importance of the ECHR position. The judi-
cial battles unfolding around PwC's role in the Yukos case in Russia are
unlikely to come to an end for at least a couple of years and have a good
chance of migrating to the US courts. Nevertheless, answers to these two
226. Taking into consideration the growing number of Russian companies' IPOs, espe-
cially in London, the problem is now how to protect international investors from new
corporate disasters. Overregulation and overwhelming control may lead to not only to the
uncontrollable migration of issuers from one stock exchange to another, as has already hap-
pened with New York and London, but to de-listings as has happened with Tatneft. Press
Release, Tatneft, O.A.O. Tatneft Announces Notice to NYSE Re Delisting (Aug. 18, 2006),
available at http://www.marketwire.conmw/release.do?id=695859&k=O.A.O.%2Tatneft. In
this situation, while the Russian Government makes attempts to promote Russian IPOs for
Russian companies, the choice for the western regulators will be a difficult one: whether to
introduce new regulatory regime or lose Russian issuers. See, e.g., Maria Ermakova, London
and Moscow Exchanges to Cooperate on IPOs, HERALD TRIB., Mar. 1, 2006, at 20; Mos-
news.com, 150 Russian Companies to Hold IPO over Two Years-Stock Market Specialist,
Apr. 4, 2007, available at http://www.huliq.comll9466/150-russian-companies-to-hold-ipo-
over-two-years-stock-market-specialist; Posting of Charles Ganske to http://www.russiablog.
org/2007/04/russian-ipos-week - 15_of 2007_r.php (Apr. 16, 2007).
227. See, e.g., John A. E. Pottow, Greed and Pride in International Bankruptcy: The
Problems of and Proposed Solutions to "Local Interests," 104 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1923-25
(2006); Matteo M. Winkler, Arbitration without Privity and Russian Oil: the Yukos Case be-
fore the Houston Court, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 115, 152-53 (2006).
228. See, e.g., Arbitration Court Oks PwC Tax Bill, KOMMERSANT, Oct. 4, 2007,
http://www.kommersant.com/p8lll30/YUKOS-auditing/; Free Mikhail Khodorkovsky,
Timeline of Pressure on PwC by the Russian Government, http://www.supportmbk.com/what/
documents/PWCTimeline.pdf (last visited July 18, 2007).
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questions would permit a full stop to the Yukos story and answer a prin-
cipal political question: What did Yukos and its shareholders actually
represent? An organized corporate criminal group of tremendous com-
plexity and power, or an extremely powerful group of individuals who
were regarded as a danger to the interests of Putin's ruling elite?
The Yukos case has unveiled the possible dangers of money launder-
ing legislation in the hands of governments with transitional economies
and weak democratic traditions. Even if the anti-money laundering laws
of the country comply with international pronouncements to the letter,
there are still a number of ways the laws could be used for the sole pur-
pose of persecuting political opponents. In the Yukos case, the money
laundering charges were interrelated with the charges of corporate tax
evasion, which, taken separately, in Russia, represent a rather weak tool
for suppressing the political opponents, but taken together they are per-
fect for the confiscation of assets. This allowed the investigators to
represent the activities of the giant corporate group as a process of com-
mitting organized criminal offense that continued for more than seven
years.
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